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GERMAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT OVER EUROPE:
FRANCE

Description

An analysis of the political, economic, social, and military controls which the Nazis established for the government and exploitation of France.

Washington

27 December 1944

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This study is Part Three, Section One, II, of the series

GERMAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT OVER EUROPE

the outline of which is as follows:

Part One. Principles and Methods of German Military Government over Europe

Part Two. German Controls in Occupied Europe

I. The German Army in Occupied Europe
II. The SS and Police in Occupied Europe
III. Military and Police Tribunals in Occupied Europe
IV. The Nazi Party in Occupied Europe
V. Technical and Economic Troops in Occupied Europe
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FRANCE

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II. FRANCE

A. INTRODUCTION

The pattern of German military government in France differed from that in other occupied countries of Western Europe in that relations between France and Germany throughout the period of occupation were nominally those of two independent states. Unlike the exiled legal governments of Belgium, Holland, Norway, and Poland, the French government which signed the Armistice of 25 June 1940 continued to operate as the constitutional authority and to receive the diplomatic representatives of neutral powers, including the United States, as well as of Axis and Axis-dominated countries. Likewise the Vichy government accredited its own diplomatic agents to neutral and formerly enemy countries. Although no French ambassador was maintained at Berlin, Fernand de Brinon acted as Vichy representative to the German occupation authorities at Paris, with the title of Ambassador and assisted by a considerable staff of liaison officers. With the exception of a period following the total occupation of France, Otto Abetz occupied the post of German Ambassador at Paris while Krug von Nidda acted as German Consul General at Vichy. Much later, in 1943, Renthe-Fink went to Vichy as German Chargé d'Affaires. German military government in France, then, was operated within the framework of diplomatic relations between a victorious state and a vanquished nation which, in theory, retained an independence modified only by the armistice terms it had accepted.

This French independence was illusory, however, although it is sometimes difficult to determine whether the actions of the French Government were due to its own volition or to German pressure. Following the signing of the Armistice, the government installed itself at Vichy where, on 10 July 1940,

Marshal Pétain was given full authority by the National Assembly, composed of the joint membership of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, to promulgate a new constitution for the French State. The subsequent action of the Marshal and his advisors was directed to the establishment of a Fascist state through the medium of a "National Revolution" which would place the aspirations of France in harmony with the German "New Order" for Europe. Because this program committed the Vichy government to a policy of close collaboration, the German pattern of military government in France must be explained largely in terms of indigenous French Fascism.

Vichy's adoption of the Fascist philosophy, however, does not obscure the fact that Germany came to exercise an almost complete domination over France, largely through the extension of its military control. This extension of German military authority may be traced through three stages: the period of operations, the Armistice years, and the period of total occupation. In each of these stages, German military government was established on a different basis.

B. THE PHASES OF GERMAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT

1. The Period of Operations

In the brief period of operations extending from 12 May to the Armistice of 25 June 1940, German military government was based on a series of decrees which probably were prepared prior to the invasion and which, for the most part, were issued under the signature of the Commander in Chief of the Armies. As the Germans advanced through France, their first administrative act was to post a notice advising the local population that the German military authorities had assumed all powers necessary to ensure the security of the army and the maintenance of order, that every person was to comply with the orders issued by the military command, and that local officials were to continue their functions on the condition that they maintain a loyal attitude toward the German Army.1/

This first administrative pronouncement was followed by a series of decrees which came into immediate effect and which remained an important part of the political and economic pattern of military government in France throughout the period of occupation. On the political side, force of law was given to all decrees and regulations issued during the occupation period by competent military authorities. The laws of France were to remain in force only insofar as they were compatible with such degrees and regulations. Other ordinances provided for the application of German law by German military tribunals and endowed local military commanders with authority to punish individuals not subject to the military penal code.2/ On the economic side, various decrees of the Commander in Chief established the

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1/ Verordnungsblatt für das besetzte Gebiet der französischen Departments Seine, Seine-et-Oise und Seine-et-Marne, 21 June 1940, p. 2. The title was later changed to Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten französischen Gebiete. Both are referred to hereafter as Vbl. Fr.

2/ Vbl. Fr., 21 June 1940, pp. 5 ff.

Reichskreditkassen to facilitate German financial operations in the occupied territory, empowered the military authorities to ensure the operations of businesses whose owners and managers had fled by the appointment of temporary administrators, provided controls over certain commodities subject to immediate requisition for the use of the German military machine, and regulated imposts and the collection of customs taxes.1/

Toward the end of this period and after the fall of Paris, a preliminary to permanent military administration was established in the Paris region under a Military Commander (Militärbefehlshaber Paris). In addition to promulgating the various decrees already operative in previously occupied areas, the Military Commander of Paris issued orders against the hoarding of supplies and decreed the freezing of wages and prices.2/ Another ordinance provided for the restitution of German property seized by the French as a war measure.3/

Shortly after the end of hostilities, this temporary authority exercised by the Field Command of the German Army and by the Military Commander of Paris was supplanted by a more permanent administration organized to meet the needs of Armistice arrangements.

2. The Armistice Period

a. The North (Occupied) Zone

From the cessation of hostilities on 25 June 1940 until the total occupation of France in November 1942, German military administration in France was established on the basis of the Armistice terms and was conducted in two zones distinct as to the theoretical degree of German control and as to the means through which the control was exercised. These

1/ Vbl. Fr., 21 June 1940, pp. 24-27.
2/ Vbl. Fr., 20 June 1940, p. 7.
3/ Vbl. Fr., 30 June 1940, p. 29.

two zones were established by means of a line of demarcation originally extending from Geneva, Dole, Chalon-sur-Saône Paray-le-Monial, Moulins, Bourges, Vierzon, then, in the direction of Tours as far as twenty kilometers to the east of Tours, after which the boundary ran parallel to the railway line between Angoulême and Bordeaux as far as Mont-de-Marsin and St. Jean-de-Pied.1/ The territory north and west of this line including the entire Atlantic coast formed the North Zone and was occupied by German troops. The Armistice terms accorded the Reich all the rights of an occupying power in this area with the proviso, however, that French administration should be maintained. The French Government established at Vichy had the authority to legislate for the North, or Occupied, Zone, subject to the prior approval of such legislation by the German authorities. The French were pledged to support the orders relating to German occupational rights, however, and to collaborate with the conquerors in meeting the requirements of military occupation.2/

b. The South (Unoccupied) Zone

The area south and east of the demarcation line formed the South, or Unoccupied, Zone, where the Vichy government in theory exercised full authority. In reality, however, the Vichy administration was subject to strong German controls exercised by authorities deriving their powers from the German Armistice Commission which was set up to supervise the execution of the Armistice terms. Because these terms were sufficiently general to allow interpretations giving considerable latitude to the activities of the Commission, German authority in the South Zone was only slightly less effective than in the North Zone. The Franco-German co-operation

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1/ Franco-German Armistice Convention, Art. II.
2/ Ibid.

provided for in the Occupied Zone by the Armistice terms was facilitated in the unoccupied area as well by the transformation of the French Constitution from democracy to dictatorship and by the rising power of that Vichy element which first advocated a strong pro-German policy at Montoire in the autumn of 1940.

The division of France into occupied and unoccupied zones was clearly to the disadvantage of the Vichy-controlled area. The territory of the South Zone represented only 40 percent of that of Metropolitan France and comprised fifteen million inhabitants as compared with the twenty-seven millions of the North Zone. With the exception of bauxite, which is found almost exclusively in Southern France, the major portion of the mineral resources of the country was located in the occupied territory. The greater part of the richer agricultural lands was similarly situated. However, the distinction between the two zones in matters of economic as well as political controls tended to become less sharp as German military authority remained longer in effect and as the French Government showed increasing tendencies toward a more willing collaboration.

3. The Period of Total Occupation.

As a consequence of the Allied landing in North Africa, the Germans invaded the hitherto Unoccupied Zone on 11 November 1942. From this date until the liberation of France, German military government no longer existed on the basis of the Armistice conventions but on military occupation strengthened by the increased cooperation of a Vichy government whose personnel rapidly assumed a decided pro-German tinge. The mattersarising out of the occupation of the South Zone and the problems of French collaboration apparently were decided at a two-day conference which took place at the German Embassy in Paris in December 1942. The German

delegates to this conference included Colonel Kosmann, representing the Commander of the occupation troops in France; Krug von Nidda, Hitler's representative at Vichy; Otto Abetz, German Ambassador at Paris, and Colonel Böhme of the German Armistice Commission. The Vichy government was represented by Laval, de Brinon, and minor officials of the Foreign Ministry.1/

The arrangements as regards the South Zone were such that the German action was made to appear as military occupation without the corresponding military government. In form, no change was made in the authority of the Vichy government, and the German Armistice Commission continued to function in its "pre-occupation" fashion. Until the Allied invasion of continental France became imminent, no rigid chain of military command was set up such as characterized the North Zone. The needs of the occupation troops were made known through liaison staffs established at the various prefectures.

As early as March 1943, however, the Armistice Commission began to claim some of the rights of an occupying power and put forth such demands as the delivery to German authorities of escaped prisoners of war refugees in the South Zone, the exemption of skilled workers in armament factories from service in youth camps, and the surrender of certain quantities of French military equipment to the German authorities. In the last months of the same year and the early part of 1944, when the Allied invasion began to threaten, more rigid military controls were inaugurated on the North Zone model. Along the Mediterranean coast, in particular, the German occupation authorities assumed all the prerogatives exercised in the North Zone. This change, however, was indicative of a deterioration, rather than an improvement, in the pattern of German military

1/ Krasnaia Zvezda, 9 September 1944.

government in France. The extension of the powers of the Military Command tended to fuse military government with the Field Commands and thus facilitated the withdrawal of the occupation administrations following the invasion.

C. THE ORGANIZATION OF GERMAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT

1. The North Zone

a. The Military Commander for Belgium and North France (Militärbefehlshaber Belgien und Nord Frankreich)

Subsequent to the Armistice, the German authorities created two significant divisions in the North Zone. The three departments comprising Alsace-Lorraine (Haut-Rhin, Bas-Rhin, and Moselle) were annexed by Germany and the frontiers of 1870 were restored. For administrative purposes, the departments of the Nord and Pas-de-Calais were attached to the military administration for Belgium and came under General von Falkenhausen, Military Commander for Belgium and North France (Militärbefehlshaber Belgien und Nord Frankreich). Immediate control over the two departments was exercised through the Higher Field Commands (Oberfeldkommandanturen) at Lille, which were subordinate to the authority of the Military Commander. Although Vichy legislation was applicable in these departments, German administration generally was established on the Belgian model. Anti-Semitic legislation fitted the Belgian pattern, as did also the policies of labor recruitment.

b. The Military Commander for France (Militärbefehlshaber Frankreich)

The remainder of the North Zone came under the Military Commander for France (Militärbefehlshaber Frankreich), a position held during the greater part of the occupation by General Otto von Stülpnagel. The Military Governor controlled the administration of civilian affairs and likewise had administrative authority over military subdivisions of the German Army in France. For operational purposes, however, the latter were under the higher authority of Field Marshal Karl Gerd von Rundstedt, Commander in Chief

of Army Group D, who appears to have exercised considerable influence over German military administration in France.

The staff of the Military Commander was divided into two branches. A Military Staff (Kommandostab) controlled military affairs and directed the various regional subdivisions of the military administration. The Administrative Staff (Verwaltungsstab) had a number of functions, the most important of which were related to economic matters (see G 3, c) and propaganda activities (see F 1, a). The two branches of the staff worked in close collaboration, and representatives of the Administrative Staff were found in most of the regional offices of the military administration.

(1) The Military Staff (Kommandostab)

For the purposes of administration, the Military Staff established a hierarchy of regional subdivisions for the North Zone. The largest of these subdivisions were the four Military Administrative Districts (Militärverwaltungs-bezirke) each commanded by a Befehlshaber with the status of a corps commander. They were as follows:

	Headquarters	Approximate area
Military District A	Saint-Germain-en-Laye	Territory north and east of line Caen-Orléans-Troyes-Nancy
Military District B	Angers	West of above line and north of Loire River
Military District C	Dijon	Eastern France south of line Caen-Orléans-Troyes-Nancy
Military District D	Bordeaux	South of Loire

Greater Paris formed a fifth District established on the same administrative level and commanded by a Kommandant.

These districts were further divided into smaller administrative units. Higher Field Commands

(Oberfeldkommandanturen), which administered several French departments, were commanded by officers with divisional status. Directly under them were Field Commands (Feld-kommandanturen), located at the seat of each departmental prefecture and directed by officers with the rank of regimental commanders. Not as regularly distributed as the Field Commands, the District Commands (Kreiskommandanturen) were found at the chef-lieux of the arrondissements. Last in the hierarchy of regional organization were the Municipal Commands (Ortskommandanturen), established only in towns of military importance. The various Kommandanturen were the official links between the French people and the occupying troops, the latter being forbidden to deal with the French authorities except through the proper military authority. The officers of the Kommandanturen were often housed in the same building with those of the French administration of corresponding jurisdiction.

The Feldkommandanturen provided the backbone of this system of regional administration. The average Feldkommandantur had a personnel of 2,000 men, including military and civilian police (Feldgendarmerie and Ordnungspolizei), medical and sanitation services, and finally a Sicherungs-regiment (Security Regiment) consisting of around 1,600 troops. The primary purpose of the field troops attached to the Feldkommandanturen was to maintain order in the occupied areas and to protect lines of communication. Reliable reports indicate that when the Russian campaign began to make increased demands on German manpower, the authority of the Feldkommandanturen was sometimes extended over two or more departments while that of the Kreiskommandanturen was given the scope of a department.

(2) The Administrative Staff (Verwaltungsstab)

The Administrative Staff was concerned primarily with the execution of the decrees of the Military Administration, particularly those relating to economic matters and propaganda. Directed by Dr. Schmidt, it comprised a personnel of approximately one thousand individuals who constituted an elite of administrative officials with special qualifications for their work in France.1/ In view of the relative smallness of their numbers, these civilian administrators probably depended on local units of the Military Staff for assistance in dealing with the local French authorities. Both military and administrative staffs were attached to the four Verwaltungsbezirke, while administrative groups (Verwaltungsgruppen) assisted the Field Commanders.2/

The work of the administrative staff was facilitated by the Armistice obligation of the French Government to execute the regulations of the occupation authorities when called on to do so. The Vichy government made considerable changes in personnel throughout the administration of local government and in the local branches of national agencies. Wherever new appointments were made for the North Zone the approval of the German authorities had to be obtained. Thus, there was built up a personnel who could, for all practical purposes, be relied on to carry out the orders relayed by the Administrative Staff. The fact that the offices of the German officials were often located in the same buildings as those of the local French administrators provided an initial check on the latter.

(3) The Legislative Authority of the Military Commander

The Military Commander exercised German legislative

1/ Berliner Börsenzeitung, 2 November 1940.
2/ Carl Johanny, "Die Militärverwaltung in Frankreich und Belgien," Deutsche Verwaltung, 25 November 1940.

power in France. Decrees and ordinances were signed by him and executed by local German officials acting either directly or through the local French officials. The Feldkommandanten often made detailed regulations implementing the decrees of the Military Commander. Until May 1941, when a Franco-German agreement re-established the administrative unity of France and permitted the extension of Vichy administrative measures to the whole of France (excluding Alsace-Lorraine), German legislation covered every conceivable field of activity. After that date it was confined in practice to a fairly narrow range of subjects; it had been found more satisfactory to inspire French authorities to enact desired legislation in such fields as economic and social legislation, control of various types of associations, and control of production. The subjects dealt with by German legislation were usually such as directly affected the security of the Army -- definition of the competence of military tribunals, provision for the prevention and punishment of sabotage, control of means of propaganda, control of all communications with the Vichy Zone and with foreign countries, enactment of regulations for civilian defense, control of stocks and stabilization of prices (these were turned over more and more to French authorities), etc. One notable field in which German legislation was the rule was anti-Jewish legislation. The Military Commander enacted laws similar to those of Germany for the Paris Zone; the Vichy government enacted anti-Jewish laws, but they were not as severe as those of the Paris Zone.

2. The South Zone

a. The Armistice Commission

(1) Central Organization

In the South Zone, which remained unoccupied until

the North African invasion and which was nominally under the full authority of the Vichy government, controls were exercised through the German Armistice Commission set up for the implementation of the Armistice terms.1/

Although its competence extended to all of France, for which it negotiated the broad policies of control, this Commission, for the most part, left the actual conduct of affairs in the North Zone to the Military Government. The German Commission was headed at first by General Otto von Stülpnagel, who appears to have held this post jointly with that of Military Commander of the North Zone until 1 April 1941, when he was replaced as Chief of the Armistice Commission by General Vogl. General Vogl was assisted by a General Staff which included Colonel Böhme, Chief of Staff; General Neubronn von Eisenberg, the Inspector of the French Army; and Hemmen, President of the Economic Delegation.2/

(a) The Politico-Military Controls Division.

The German Commission had two principal divisions: a Politico-Military Controls Division and a special Economic Commission. Charged with the enforcement of the Armistice terms and with the control of French armed forces and military equipment, the politico-military controls division had the following six subsections or divisions, the first three of which were concerned with the military features of the Armistice agreements:

i. Division of Ground Forces, headed by Lieutenant Colonel Bürklin

ii. Naval Division, administered at first by Admiral Wäffer and later by Captain Petzold

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1/ Franco-German Armistice Convention, Art. 22.
2/ The discussion of the Armistice Commission testimony of Colonel Böhme given to the Russian journal, Krasnaia Zvezda, 9 September 1944.

iii. Division Of Air Forces, directed by Colonel Knoblauch who was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Sorge, later succeeded by Lieutenant Colonel Blechinger

iv. Division of War Industry, headed by Colonel Steffer and subsequently by Lieutenant Colonel Quciss. This division maintained control over the armament plants in the South Zone to prevent the diversion of materials and equipment to other than German use.

v. Administrative Division, headed by Colonel Müller and having the function of supplying interpreter-translators and liaison officers with the French delegation attached to the Commission.

vi. Division of External Relations, directed by Colonel Henke and after January 1943 by Legationsrat Taffel. Containing three representatives of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this division supervised the issuance of passports and visas for those crossing the demarcation line and handled all affairs relating to German property rights and claims for damage in the South Zone.

(b) The Special Economic Commission. The special Economic Commission organized under the German Armistice Commission and headed by Hemmen had as its main function the implementation of German economic demands in the unoccupied territory. (See G 3, d.) It supervised the collection of the occupation payments and the general German exploitation of the South Zone. This commission was divided into twelve subsections: finance, trade, war industry and fuel, merchant marine, armament, intercommunication, transport, labor, credit, agriculture, forests, and

general economic questions. Unlike the Politico-Military Controls Division, which had its seat at Wiesbaden, the Economic Commission was located at Paris.

(2) Local Administration

To facilitate its work, the German Armistice Commission divided France into two control inspectorates, one for the North Zone and one for the South Zone. Prior to the collapse of French authority in North Africa, a control inspectorate was located there also. These inspectorates, which functioned for both the Politico-Military Controls Division and the special Economic Commission, were further subdivided into smaller administrative units established in the more important towns in the South Zone. Operating in conjunction with other agencies of the Reich in France, these local units executed the decisions taken at Wiesbaden by the Controls Division and at Paris by the special Economic Commission.

b. The French Delegation to the Armistice Commission

Compliance with German demands in matters concerning unoccupied France was secured largely through the French delegation to the Armistice Commission. The French delegation, headed successively by Generals Huntziger, Doyen, Beynet, and Bérard was composed of various liaison officers, military and economic experts, and translators. From Wiesbaden the delegation maintained contact with the Vichy government by telephone, telegraph, and airplane. The German Commission presented its demands and complaints to the French section, which settled them in consultation with the government at Vichy. On the lower levels, French liaison officers attached to the German inspectorate controls and smaller administrative units usually settled technical questions of a local nature to the satisfaction of the

German members. The only weapon available to the French delegation and to its government in opposing German demands was that of protest, which proved for the most part to be quite ineffective.

3. Administrative Reorganization under Total Occupation

a. The North Zone

Following the total occupation of France, the machinery of German military government in the North and South Zones naturally underwent some modification. While most of these changes were limited to the previously unoccupied South Zone, some administrative alterations also took place in the North Zone. Because of the necessity of spreading the occupying troops over a wider area and because, for military reasons, the Germans desired to make the areas of military administration correspond more closely to those of the field forces, the four Military Administration Districts which were established in the North Zone following the Armistice were compressed into three. To these was added an Army District, South France (Heeresgebiet, Südfrankreich) for the administration of the previously unoccupied South Zone. The reorganized districts were:

District	Headquarters
Military District, Northwest France	St. Germain-en-Laye
Military District, Southwest France	Angers
Military District, Northeast France	Dijon
Army District, South France	Lyon

Greater Paris retained its status as a fifth district on the same administrative level. No change took place in the lower administrative units organized under the Military Administration Districts, and the authority of the Military Commander of France was never extended to the South Zone.

b. The South Zone

(1) The Establishment of Liaison Headquarters (Verbindungsstab)

Until 1944, when France was faced with the prospect of invasion, the Germans attempted to give their occupation of the South Zone only an operational significance. The Commander of the Army District of South France did not assume the prerogatives that were exercised by the Military Commander in the North Zone and, in form, no change was made either in the powers of the Vichy government or in the functions of the Armistice Commission. Actually, however, the Germans moved in and established a hierarchy of liaison headquarters (Verbindungsstäbe) similar in their administrative functions to the Kommandanturen in the North Zone but more economical in terms of personnel though equally as effective. Chief liaison headquarters (Hauptverbindungsstäbe) were set up at every regional prefecture, with subordinate liaison headquarters (Verbindungsstäbe) equivalent to the Feldkommandanturen at the departmental level. Smaller units (Aussenstellen) were located in every town of ten thousand or more; smaller towns were not the seat of permanent military headquarters although temporary headquarters might be established in such places from time to time.

The liaison headquarters had less personnel than the Feldkommandanturen. That at Lins-la-Saulnier (Jura), for example, had a staff of about twenty-five persons. The powers of the liaison headquarters, although exercised less directly than those of the North Zone administrative units, were equally important.

These liaison groups were expected to deal with the prefect, who would pass their orders on to such French officials as the regional military commissioners (commissaires

régionaux militaires) for billeting; labor inspectors (inspecteurs de travail) for labor recruits; inspectors of industrial production (inspecteurs de production industrielle) for merchandise vouchers; road and bridge engineers (ingénieurs de ponts et chaussées) for transport; and treasury agents (trésoriers-payeurs généraux) for financial matters.

(2) Direct Military Administration

At the beginning of 1944, however, when preparations to meet the expected Allied invasion were being rushed, the indirect controls of the liaison headquarters began to give way to the direct military administration of the type which characterized the North Zone. A notice of 15 February 1944 signed by the Commander of the Army District, South France, announced that henceforth the German Army would exercise the rights of the occupying authority in the Mediterranean coastal area, including Pyrenees-Orientales, Aude, Hérault, Gard, Bouches-du-Rhone, Var, and the Alpes-Maritime.1/ A subsequent decree issued by the same authority for the protection of the German Army invoked harsh penalties for sabotage, carrying of arms, listening to enemy broadcasts, etc. It appears that, even earlier in this coastal area, Verbindungsstäbe began to be replaced by Feldkommandanturen on the North Zone model, notably at Lyon and Marseilles. It is probable that, by the time of D-Day, German military administration in the South Zone had come to approximate that in the North Zone, with the Commander of the Army District, South France, exercising through the medium of Feldkommandanturen the same authority as the Military Commander of the North Zone.

4. Inter-zonal Controls

a. North-South Zone Communications

The line of demarcation which separated North and

1/ Verordnungsblatt des Kommandanten des Heeresgebietes Süd-Frankreich für den Küstenbereich Mittelmeer, 15 February 1944, p. 1.

South Zones was dictated partly by German military strategy and economic needs and partly by its value as an instrument of control which, dividing the country as it did, facilitated the maintenance of German authority with a minimum of military supervision. Prior to January 1943, when the demarcation line was officially "suppressed" following the occupation of the South Zone, the Germans made traffic between the two zones as difficult as possible but showed a tendency to relax their restrictions as the Vichy government proved itself increasingly disposed to collaboration. The crossing of the demarcation line could be made only by those provided with a pass issued in the occupied area by the Feldkommandanturen and in the free zone by the Division of External Relations of the Armistice Commission. The movement between the zones had to take place at official crossing stations of which there were six, located at Moulins, Langon, Chalon-sur-Saône, Mont Pont, Vierzon, and Paray-le-Monial. Passes for personal reasons were difficult to secure; those for business purposes, especially as they were related to the collaboration efforts of French industry, were comparatively easy to procure.

The line of demarcation was also utilized as a customs barrier. After the agreement of May 1941, however, the Germans encouraged commerce between the two zones except in matters of foreign exchange and securities. An ordinance of 11 August 1942 forbade the sending of legal tender or securities from the occupied zone abroad or to unoccupied France without the authorization of the German military authorities.1/ German officials were excluded from the operations of this decree. Postal regulations were less stringent. In the autumn of 1940 printed post cards were allowed to pass between the two zones, and

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1/ Vbl. Fr., 10 August 1942, p. 425.

gradually regulations were relaxed until March 1943, when postal services became almost normal, although parcels, printed matter, and currency continued to be excluded from the mails.1/

On the South Zone side, a special French police force was created to control traffic passing into the North Zone. All persons illegally crossing the demarcation line were subject to arrest and disciplinary penalties meted out by the German authorities. On the North Zone side, supervision of the demarcation line was the responsibility of the Strengthened Frontier Post Service (Verstärkte Grenzaufsichtsdienst -- VGAD), which was responsible to the Military Commander of France and had its central headquarters (Kommandostelle) at Paris. This service was divided into various regional and district subdivisions (Befehlsstellen and Abteilungen).

b. Forbidden Zones

(1) North Zone

(a) The Forbidden Zone (Zone Interdite). At the conclusion of the Armistice, the German military authorities created a so-called Forbidden Zone (Zone Interdite) as a defensive line guarding the north and northeast of France. This zone consisted of the departments which were contiguous to the Belgian, Alsatian, and Swiss frontiers and included the Nord, Pas-de-Calais, Meuse, Meurthe-et-Moselle, Vosges, Haute-Saône, and Doubs in addition to parts of the departments of the Somme, Aisne, Ardennes, Haute-Marne, and Jura. With the exception of Nord and Pas-de-Calais, which were attached to the territorial authority of the Military Commander of Belgium and North France (see C 1, a), the principal difference between the Forbidden Zone and the

1/ VBl. Fr., 14 November 1940, p. 125.

rest of the occupied area was to be found in the stricter military supervision over residence in and communications between the two areas. Many categories of French citizens, including demobilized soldiers, were not allowed to return to the zone, although several thousand actually returned illegally. Only those French officials who were in the zone at the time of occupation were permitted to remain. As all new officials were forbidden entrance, the French administration in this area remained inadequate. After the total occupation, however, travel restrictions between the Forbidden Zone and other areas of occupied France were relaxed and many refugees returned. Although the Vichy government announced at the time that the line dividing the Forbidden Zone and the other areas of France had been suppressed, the consent of the German authorities was still necessary for crossing the line and for the resumption of residence in the restricted area.

(b) The Forbidden Coastal Zone (Zone Côtière Inderdite). In October 1941, the Germans created a second Forbidden Zone (Zone Côtière Interdite), running the length of the Atlantic coast line of the North Zone. In this region, the depth of which varied from ten to thirty kilometers, restrictions were particularly severe. Changes of residence were prohibited, and those people inhabiting the coastal departments just outside the forbidden area were compelled to secure certificates of residence. Until February 1943, all telephonic communications in this zone were cut off. Even after the theoretical abolition of the demarcation line, following the total occupation, regulations in matters concerning residence and travel remained. In that part of the Forbidden Coastal Zone lying between the northern Forbidden Zone and Pas-de-Calais, special permits were required and residents could move freely only within

a radius of five kilometers of their homes. To enter this forbidden area, an additional laissez-passer was required.

(2) The South Zone

Following the total occupation in November 1942, special forbidden areas were established in the South Zone similar to those previously inaugurated in the North Zone. On 18 November 1942, the French authorities created a small restricted area near the Spanish frontier on the order of the Germans. With the occupation of the Mediterranean coast and the beginnings of coastal defense construction by the Organisation Todt, several forbidden zones were established. In January 1943, the area contained in the Sete-Montpelier-Beziers triangle was made a Forbidden Zone. A similar status was given to areas in the Hérault, the Aude, and the Pyrénées-Orientales in the following May to facilitate stricter control of the Spanish frontier and of refugees seeking to escape across the border, a zone Reservé Pyrénené was established in 1943.

The regulations for these South Zone forbidden areas were similar to those which operated in the North. In some coastal areas foreigners were completely evacuated while in others a special German permit was required for alien residence. Access to certain Mediterranean zones was forbidden to all civilians and in many cases the civilian population was entirely evacuated.

c. German Evacuation Policy

Throughout the period of German domination, the compulsory evacuation of French civilians from strategic localities and forbidden zones situated in coastal or frontier areas was frequently ordered by the German military authorities. Very often applied to large cities on the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts, these evacuations were designed either

to ensure a maximum effectiveness for military operations or to dissolve potential centers of anti-German resistance. Although beyond the scope of announced aims, such population displacements also facilitated the German labor draft by creating large unemployed labor reserves in refugee areas.

The methods of evacuation were usually left to the French authorities. Beyond specifying the time limits for the implementation of their orders, the German authorities were seldom concerned with the details of the population movements. In the case of certain Mediterranean coast evacuations, however, the Germans did arrange the schedule of railroad transportation for evacuees. Again, in the evacuation of the Channel coast, when they gave the French authorities less than a day's notice of their plans, the occupation officials transported the civilian population by army trucks at night to towns several hundred kilometers distant. The local authorities were ordered to lodge the evacuees for one night in preparation for a movement further southward.

As a rule, however, German orders for the evacuation of specified areas were transmitted either to the Vichy government or to the local authorities. When action was particularly urgent, the German directives were usually given to the local officials, as was the case with the partial evacuation of Marseilles when the military authorities threatened to cut off the city's food supply in order to secure immediate compliance with their orders. Evacuation very seldom entailed the removal of the entire population. In the case of Marseilles, the inhabitants were divided into four classes:

(1) Indispensable persons (firemen, police, roadworkers)

(2) Necessary persons (workers and certain classes of white collar workers)

(3) Useful persons (usually wives of the above classes)

(4) Useless persons (the aged, invalids, etc.)

Those persons in the last category and those who had no special reason for staying were the first evacuated.

The Vichy services for evacuation and reception of refugees were co-ordinated under the Secretary of State for Interior. The real labor in connection with the measures was performed by the regional and departmental prefects and by the mayors. These officials were aided by a number of official and semi-official organizations, including the Red Cross, the Secours National, and the pro-German Comité Ouvrier de Secours Immediat. In addition to carrying out compulsory orders of the German authorities, the Vichy government, on its own initiative, also conducted large-scale evacuations, particularly of school children from bombed areas. It is estimated that the total number of evacuees, as of February 1944, surpassed one and one-half million.

D. GERMAN SECURITY CONTROLS

1. Disarmament

a. Demobilization of the French Military Forces

The demobilization of the French Armed Forces in accordance with the terms of the Armistice Convention was carried out in the occupied zone by the German Field Commands, acting as agents of the Armistice Commission, and in the unoccupied zone through the Armistice Commission directly. In occupied France, the disarmed troops, approximately two million in number, passed under the control of the German Command as prisoners of war, and their arms, armament, and equipment became the property of the German Army.

The five hundred thousand troops located in the South Zone were disarmed by the Vichy government working under the supervision of the Division of Ground Forces and the Division of Air Forces of the German Armistice Commission. The operation was conducted from six troop concentration points designated by the government. All orders for disarming the troops were issued by the French government and all work connected with the task was performed by French officers. German supervision was exercised at each concentration point by a Control Commission of from forty to fifty persons including various types of arms specialists, interpreter-translators, and officer personnel.

All arms, ammunition, and equipment gathered in the South Zone were stored in depots selected by the Vichy government and guarded by French soldiers. At each depot, however, a German Control Station consisting of one commissioned officer and two non-commissioned officers was maintained with the right to check the inventory and the condition of military equipment at any time it saw fit. All shortages were reported to the Armistice Commission and the Vichy government was required to explain and make restitution for any shortages discovered.

The disarming and control of the French fleet were essentially functions of the Italian Naval Commission at Turin, with which the German Commission maintained close liaison. The Naval Division of the German Armistice Commission was concerned primarily with the question of guarding and controlling those sections of the French fleet located at Dakar, Martinique, Casablanca, French Indo-China, and Madagascar. Only at Casablanca were the control functions exercised directly by an officer of the German Naval Commission. With the exception of Saigon, where these functions were conducted by the German diplomatic representatives, the German Naval Division was compelled to operate through pressure placed upon the Vichy government. The Germans have claimed that neutralization of the French fleet at Alexandria was the result of their efforts conducted through the Vichy government and the mediation of the Swiss consul. After the destruction of the French fleet at Toulon, the loss of Vichy control over North Africa, and the collapse of Italy, the functions of the Naval Division of the Armistice Commission were reduced to controlling the coastal defenses of Southern France.

b. The Armistice Army

By a unilateral act of the German High Command, the size of the French army permitted by the Armistice Convention was fixed at 100,000 men, including all military employees engaged at the various military institutions, the Ministry of War, and the General Staff. With the exception of tank troops, motorized units, and heavy artillery with guns of 100 mm. or more, the Vichy government was allowed to make proposals on the kind and organization of the units to be retained within the limits of 100,000 men. The Vichy government requested eight infantry divisions and two cavalry brigades, a request approved by the German Armistice Commission with only

a few minor changes.

The Armistice Army was stationed in eight specified areas and the commander of each of the divisions was also commander of the military area in which his troops were stationed. German controls over the Armistice Army were operated through three Control Commissions, each comprising a number of the French military districts. The amount of arms, ammunition, and equipment for the French Army was fixed by the Armistice Commission at the minimum necessary for bringing the units into combat readiness. When it was necessary to replace arms or equipment for the army, the Vichy government had to justify its request before the Armistice Commission. If the request was granted, the Commission issued a written permit to be presented to the Control Station of the arms depot in that area where the German officer in charge supervised the withdrawal of the stores.

By the terms of the Armistice, the French were not permitted an air force. Following the British air attack on Oran in July 1940, however, the Armistice Commission granted the Vichy government's request for permission to maintain a limited number of airplane and anti-aircraft batteries to defend important centers in the South Zone against British air attacks. The Armistice Commission fixed the number of planes permitted at five hundred and established definite categories for reconnaissance, bombardment, training, and transport planes. The justification of bombardment planes was established on the necessity of protecting the French fleet at Toulon against the British fleet. In addition to the five hundred aircraft, the Vichy government was allowed to organize fifteen anti-aircraft batteries. Controls over the new French Air Force were exercised by the Division of Air Forces of the German Armistice Commission. These controls were operated through two commissions, one each

for the two aviation areas into which the French Air Force was divided.

c. The Regulation of Arms Production

Because the French war plants in the South Zone were producing for the German war machine, it was necessary to prevent the production of unauthorized armaments and the diversion of war materials to illegal use. These preventive functions were performed by the Division of War Industry of the German Armistice Commission. After the cessation of hostilities, the Division of War Industries, operating through three Control Commissions, first halted all war production and made an inventory of all war plants and other establishments connected with such production. All war supplies, semi-manufactured goods, and raw materials possessed by war plants were stored in warehouses, placed under guard, and were henceforth subject to the authority of the Division's Control Commissions. After this initial activity, the work of the Controls Commission of the Division of War Industry was to make certain that war plants in the unoccupied zone produced only types and quantities of materials that were authorized. In collaboration with French liaison officers, the Controls Commission made periodic checks of war plant operations. The Division had the authority to grant requests of the Vichy government for licenses permitting the manufacture of specified amounts of war materials. The Controls Commissions were responsible for ensuring that no such manufacture of war materials took place without licenses and that the quantity did not exceed the specification of the license.

d. French Armed Forces after Total Occupation

(1) Vichy-Controlled Forces

(a) The Dissolution of the Armistice Army. Following the occupation of the South Zone in November 1942, the Vichy Armistice Army was disarmed and demobilized in the same manner

as in 1940. Despite the fact that the Germans presented the occupation as an operational measure, the Armistice Commission demanded the surrender of all the remaining military equipment in the South Zone. This demand, first put forward on the ground that it was necessary "for the defense of Europe" and later on the contention that such equipment "constituted war booty," was actually predicated on the assertion of those occupational rights validated for the North Zone by the Armistice terms.

(b) The Reconstitution of French Anti-Aircraft Units. When the Armistice Army was disbanded, the operation of the French AA defenses, authorized during the summer of 1940, were taken over by the Germans. Pressed by the necessity of freeing some of the troops for duty elsewhere, however, the Germans, in the early months of 1943, decided to reorganize some of the French units under the direction of the Vichy Secretariat for Air Defense. Recruitment for these anti-aircraft units took place both by enlistment and by conscription. The AA personnel was fixed at fifteen thousand men with a German liaison officer for each group. Later, anti-aircraft units were extended to meet the needs of protecting railway lines from RAF bombings. These troops were instructed in the use of the German 88 mm. gun as well as French weapons and were utilized to protect German and French trains.

(c) The First Regiment of France (Première Régiment de France. In May 1943, the German military authorities consented to Laval's request for permission to form a First Regiment of France, composed of three thousand men. As finally constituted under the command of Colonel Berlon, a notorious pro-German sympathizer, the First Regiment consisted of three battalions and was subject to the authority of the Vichy Secretariat of State for National

Defense. The First Regiment of France was not a powerful military force and probably was designed as a sort of private army for the maintenance of Laval's regime.

(d) The Legion of French Volunteers (Légion de Volontaires Françaises -- LVF). The Légion de Volontaires Françaises represented an armed force subject to a curious combination of control shared by the Vichy government, North Zone collaborationist parties, and German military authorities. Originally created in August 1941 by the North Zone parties of Doriot, Marcel Deat, Eugene Deloncle, and Marcel Bucard, under the name of the Anti-Bolshevik Legion (Légion Française contre le Bolshevisme), the LVF was recruited to fight alongside the German armies on the Eastern Front. Given official recognition as the Légion Tricolore by the law of 18 July 1942, its permanent name was acquired by the later ordinance of 17 January 1943.

In 1943, the control of the LVF, comprising approximately four thousand men, was divided between a central committee composed of its founders and the Chief of Government, Laval. In the autumn of 1943, three of the four thousand men composing the LVF were stationed in Poland or were actively engaged in front-line operations. These troops were clothed in German uniforms and apparently were equipped and maintained at German expense. The higher commands in the formations were held by Germans. After 1942 the LVF was utilized in France largely as a secret police force for the detection of Allied and Gaullist agents.

(2) German-Organized French Forces

(a) The French Waffen-SS. Previously organized in Norway, Belgium, Holland, and Denmark, the non-German organization of the Waffen-SS, one of the many military formations of the National Socialist Party, was not extended to France until the middle of 1943. Recruitment of the Waffen-SS within France was sanctioned by the Vichy law of 22 July 1943 and was

actively encouraged by the various collaborationist political parties. The French Waffen-SS was commanded by both German and French officers. Most of its recruits were probably sent immediately to Germany where they received doctrinal instruction in National Socialist theories and practices as well as military training. The Waffen-SS was utilized abroad in the Russian campaign and in France for the guarding of strategic installations.

(b) The French NS Motor Corps (Nationalsozialistische Kraftkorps -- NSKK). Originally intended as a Party formation, the German NSKK eventually became a motor transport unit in the German Armed Forces. The French units of the NSKK were first formed in July 1942 with the encouragement of both Hitler and Pétain. As in the Waffen-SS, the higher officers of the French NSKK were Germans. The personnel was enlisted for a period of two years and received its political indoctrination and training in schools established by the Wehrmacht École des Chauffeurs in Belgium and France. According to available information, the members of French contingents of the NSKK sent to the Eastern Front were used as laborers rather than as drivers.

2. The Police

a. The German Police Organization in France

(1) Military Police

(a) The Secret Field Police (Geheime Feldpolizei). German police activity in France was conducted by both military and civilian agencies. Two branches of the German military police operated in France: the Secret Field Police (Geheime Feldpolizei) and the Field Police (Feldgendarmerie). The Secret Field Police came directly under the Commander in Chief of the occupying armies and had their headquarters at Paris. Divided into five sections, they had as their principal function the general control and protection of the German Armed Forces, the surveillance of hostile political groups, and the neutralization of enemy intelligence activity. As these functions were

largely of a counter-espionage nature, the Secret Field Police worked in close cooperation with the G-2 section (Abwehr Abteilung) of the German Army and with the Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst), the intelligence agency of the Nazi Party.

(b) The Field Police (Feldgendarmerie). The Feldgendarmerie, the ordinary military police, were attached to the various Kommandanturen and were under the jurisdiction of the Military Commander for France. In addition to protecting the armed forces, the Field Police assisted the French police in the maintenance of public order. They provided road patrols, examined papers in the forbidden areas, conducted searches, and sometimes made arrests among the civilian population. In working with the French police, they gave their orders through the prefects and mayors in ordinary cases, although in more urgent matters they sometimes gave their instructions directly.

(c) The Marine Coastal Police (Marine Küstenpolizei). In addition to these two types of military police, a coast guard service, the Marine Coastal Police, patrolled the entire coast line of occupied Europe including France. These duties, performed in conjunction with the other security services, were those of harbor police and the assurance of port security. The service wore the uniform of the German Water Protection Police (Wasserschutzpolizei), which guarded the waterways and ports of the Reich. A yellow armband signified attachment to the armed forces. The supervision of crews and passengers on incoming and outgoing vessels was the function of the Harbor Supervision Office (Hafenüberwachungsstelle) organized under the German Naval Command. 1/

(2) Civilian Police

In France as in other occupied countries, German civilian police forces were controlled by the Nazi SS and comprised four different organizations: the Order Police (Ordnungspolizei),

1/ Vbl. Fr., 17 June 1942, p. 387.

the Gestapo (Geheime Staatspolizei), the Criminal Police (Kriminalpolizei), and the Security Service of the SS (Sicherheitsdienst). After May 1942, these four police groups conducted their activities under the direction of a Higher SS and Police Leader with headquarters at Paris. Throughout the remaining period of occupation, this position was held by Major General Karl Oberg, who was directly responsible to Himmler.

(a) The Order Police (Ordnungspolizei). The Order Police were the regular uniformed German police and were usually attached to the various Kommandanturen. They functioned largely in conjunction with the French police and performed the duties of ordinary police formations such as the guarding of railroad stations and important buildings. The Order Police were directed from Paris by a Commander (Befehlshaber der Ordnungspolizei), a post occupied by SS Leader von Schweinichen.

(b) The Security Police (Sicherheitspolizei). The Gestapo and the Criminal Police were branches of a larger organization known as the Security Police and were closely associated with the Nazi Party intelligence service (Sicherheitsdienst). These three agencies functioned largely as counter-espionage services. The activities of the Criminal Police were supervised from Paris by a Direktor, Dr. Halswik. However, this section of the German police, along with the Gestapo and the Security Service, came under the direct authority of the Commander of the Security Police and the Security Service (Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des Sicherheitsdienst), who in turn was responsible to the Higher SS and Police Leader. The Paris headquarters of the Commander were divided into several sections dealing with such matters as co-operation with the French police, judicial and economic affairs, terrorist questions, and Jewish problems.

Although Gestapo and Criminal Police agents undoubtedly were active in the South Zone even before the Armistice, German police activity was restricted in theory to the North Zone until the total occupation of November 1942. After that date, the

German police organization was extended throughout France. South Zone headquarters of the Security Police and the Security Service were established at Vichy under Captain Geissler, who was responsible to Oberg at Paris. Originally confined to North Zone area headquarters at Paris and Bordeaux, regional Kommandanten were installed at Marseilles, Lyon, Montpelier, and Toulouse. Especially large police formations were concentrated at Marseilles, where it was estimated that fifteen hundred Gestapo, Security Police, and Field Police agents were located. As was true in many other fields of activity, however, the Germans preferred to keep their police groups as much in the background as possible and to conduct their work through the French organizations.

b. The French Police Organization

(1) The Police under the Third Republic.

Despite many changes, the essential police framework which existed under the Third Republic was retained by Vichy. Prior to 1940, there were four distinct elements in the French police organization: the local police, the government-controlled city police, the national police, and the military police. The local police, supported and controlled by the municipality, existed in every commune of France except a few of the largest cities. Usually known as the "municipal police" (police municipale), they were also called gardes champêtres in sparsely populated rural areas and gardiens de la paix in larger circonscriptions. In the large urban communities such as Paris, Marseilles, and Lyon the city police forces were under the jurisdiction of the national government and, with the exception of Paris, which had a special Prefect of Police, were responsible to the departmental prefect. These government-controlled city police were known as State Police (police d'état) and were divided into several sections. Those performing ordinary police functions were variously designated as police municipale

and gardiens de la paix. Criminal detection was the responsibility of the police judiciaire and the police de la sûreté.

The National Police were organized in a nation-wide investigation agency, the Sûreté Nationale, which was responsible to the Ministry of Interior and which functioned largely in matters of international crime rings and subversive activities. The military police were, for the most part, under the direction of the Ministry of War and were divided into four principal groups: the Army Gendarmes (Gendarmeries), the Naval Gendarmes (Gendarmerie Maritimes), the Republican Guard (Garde Republicaine), and the Mobile Republican Guard. The Army Gendarmes patrolled rural areas and assisted the local police in the maintenance of law and order. The Naval Gendarmes, who operated under the Ministry of Marine, policed the principal harbors and ports. The Republican Guard served as the presidential bodyguard and in ceremonial state functions. The Mobile Republican Guard was utilized in emergency police matters such as the maintenance of order during strikes and mass demonstrations.

(2) The Police under Vichy

When the Vichy government assumed control in France, the police organization inherited from the Third Republic was modified to meet the needs of the "National Revolution" and the policy of German collaboration. The changes which were initiated included the purging of non-collaborationist elements from the police force, the dissolution of some groups and the creation of new formations, and the gradual centralization of police power in the hands of one individual. The Republican Guard became Pétain's personal guard (Garde du Maréchal). Sworn to defend the person of the Marshal, the Guard was reduced from a membership of three thousand to two hundred, only those regarded as loyal to the Vichy regime being retained. The Mobile Republican Guard was dissolved in the North Zone but was retained in the South Zone. Known simply as the "Guard," it was

utilized largely to assist the new police formations of Vichy. The Army and Naval Gendarmes were continued in their pre-1940 organization although their dubious loyalty to Vichy principles reduced their importance as instruments of the government.

(a) The National Police (Police Nationale). The reorganization of civilian police under Vichy took place on both the national and regional levels. The Sûreté Nationale took the name of the Police Nationale and functioned under a Director General of Police who was responsible to the Minister of Interior. The main police branches dependent on this directorate general were the Police de Sécurité Publique, the Police de Sûreté (also known as the Police Judiciaire), the Police des Renseignments Généraux, and the Groupes Mobiles de Reserve (GMR). The Police de Sécurité Publique were responsible for the maintenance of order, the supervision of public meetings, and the suppression of anti-government demonstrations. The Police de Sécurité functioned largely as an investigative agency in matters of crime and the repression of illegal political activity. The Police de Renseignments Généraux operated as an intelligence service, collecting and supplying information for other police agencies. The Groupes Mobiles de Reserve was founded in 1941 to reinforce other police formations in the event of popular disturbances, a function performed prior to 1940 by the Mobile Republican Guard.

In addition to these four main branches of the National Police, there were several subordinate services designed to perform special duties. A Police Juive had the responsibility of controlling the Jewish population and enforcing anti-Semitic laws. The Police des Sociétés Secrètes investigated the activities of dissolved secret societies, especially those of the Freemasons. The Police Anti-Communiste, founded in 1941, was charged with the detection and apprehension of Communist agents.

Finally, the Police Economique were active in the suppression of black-market activities and the enforcement of price controls.

(b) The Regional Police. The national organization of the French police was extended to the regional level where an Intendant de Police supervised regional organizations of the Sécurité Publique, the Groupes Mobiles de Reserve, etc. With the exception of Paris, in all towns of over ten thousand (and in some cases less), the various Gardiens de la Paix and Polices Judiciaires, who formerly functioned under the direct supervision of the prefect, were brought into the regional organization of the National Police units and subjected to the authority of the Intendant de Police. Paris and the Seine Department retained their pre-Armistice organization, headed by a Prefect of the Police.

(c) The French Militia (Milice Française). In addition to these regular police formations, the French Militia (Milice Française) assumed an increasingly important role in police activities as the Vichy government passed to the control of more pronounced pro-German elements. The French Militia was the outgrowth of an earlier organization, the Service d'Ordre Legionnaire (SOL), formed by various collaborationist groups under the leading French pro-Nazi and SS leader, Joseph Darnand. This early formation pursued a campaign of counter-terror against the Resistance and suspected De Gaullists. In January 1943, the Vichy government utilized the membership of the SOL to form the French Militia, which continued to operate under Darnand and received government subsidies and training in the use of arms and the methods of guerilla warfare. The efforts of the new organization were directed to the stamping out of the Resistance.

(d) The Centralization of Police Authority. Vichy modifications of the French police system were accompanied by the centralization of police authority. In 1942, the control

over the military police units oxercised by the Ministries of War and Marine was transferred to the Ministry of Interior, of which Laval was the chief. Two years later the leadership of the French Militia was given complete control over French police activity. By a series of decrees Joseph Darnand was made Secretary General for the Maintenance of Order and took over from Laval the supervision of the military and civilian police units formerly supervised by the Ministry of Interior. The appointment of Darnand marked the climax of Franco-German police collaboration.

c. German Controls over the French Police

While the various German police organizations exercised a general surveillance over French police activities from the conclusion of the Armistice and often intervened directly in matters affecting the security of the Army, actual German control of the French police came only with the appointment of Major General Oberg as "police dictator" of France. At first restricted to the North Zone, this control was extended over the entire country as a result of the total occupation and the subsequent agreement reached on 16 April 1943 between Oberg and M. Bousquet, Secretary General of the French police . The Oberg-Bousquet agreement emphasized the following points:

(1) The task of ensuring the security of the German Army was the responsibility of the German police. The French police were entrusted with the internal security of France and the maintenance of order. Both police forces were to combat the activities of Communists, terrorists, saboteurs, and foreign agents. Information of mutual interest was to be exchanged by the two police groups.

(2) The Higher SS and Police Leader was to inform the Secretary General of the French Police of all measures taken by the Germans to co-ordinate the work of their respective police forces.

(3) All measures that the Germans wished the French police to take were to be communicated to the Secretary General by Oberg.

(4) In the South Zone, the Security Police and the Security Service agreed to conduct their activities in co-operation with the regional and departmental prefects.

(5) The French police were to turn over to the Germans all persons arrested for crimes against the security of the German Army.

The willingness of the Vichy officials to co-operate was rewarded by German efforts to strengthen the French police organization. Additional recruitments for the more reliable French police units were encouraged, and Oberg employed his influence to secure better arms and equipment for them. Nevertheless, the Germans continued to tighten their control over the operations of the French formations. In September 1943, the Higher SS and Police Leader directed that French police headquarters were to be open at all times to the inspection of the Security Police and that German police officials were to be received by Gendarmerie leaders whenever consultation was desired.

After December 1943, when Darnand rapidly brought the French police organization under the sole control of the Secretary General for the Maintenance of Order, Franco-German police collaboration became even more pronounced. Darnand encouraged the recruiting of French agents for the many German police groups and volunteers for the Allgemeine SS and the Schutz-Kommandos. Moreover, the new Secretary General secured German approval for the creation of a special police group, armed with mortars and light machine guns, for the purpose of combatting the Resistance groups. As an incentive, the Germans allowed the French police to retain a portion of the arms and equipment seized from underground organizations.

Despite Darnand's policy of strict collaboration, however, the Germans never secured the whole-hearted support of the older sections of the French police. Circulars from the Secretary General to subordinate officials indicate that the German authorities were continually forced to make arrests within the French police organization. Despite Darnand's interventions, the German police seldom revealed the reasons for their action.

In the months immediately preceding D-Day, German suspicion of the French police had become such that the counter-invasion plans of the Security Police placed chief reliance on the Militia for the French contribution to the maintenance of order behind the lines.

E. THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

1. German Military Courts and Judicial Legislation

While legal matters in France remained largely under the jurisdiction of French courts, German judicial authority was asserted in all matters affecting the security of the Army and the vital interests of the Reich. Until the total occupation, the direct exercise of this authority was limited to the North Zone. In both zones, however, the judicial machinery of the Vichy government was utilized to serve German ends.

German judicial authority in the North Zone was based on the ordinance of 10 May 1940 stipulating that actions punishable in German law were to be judged by military or special tribunals and that German law was to be applied. 1/ This German ordinance was implemented by a decree of 20 June 1940 which defined the acts making the perpetrator subject to trial under German military law. These offenses included assistance to non-German military personnel, aid to civilians fleeing occupied territory, transmission of information abroad to enemies of Germany, any act against the German Army or its personnel, distribution of tracts, the organization of meetings without advance permission from the German Kommandanten and the cessation of work or incitement thereto. 2/ In addition, various German military officials were given authority to impose disciplinary penalties for minor infractions on persons not otherwise subject to military law. The officials endowed with this power were the Kreiskommandanten (the Feldkommandanten in any area where there were no Kreiskommandanten), the Kommandant Gross-Paris, the Kommandanten der Sicherheitspolizei and the Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und SD attached to the office of the Militärbefehlshaber Frankreich. Penalties imposed by these

1. Vbl. Fr., 20 June, 1940, p. 5.
2. Vbl. Fr., 21 June, 1940, p. 15.

authorities could not exceed six weeks of confinement or fines of more than 30,000 RM. Appeals could be made through the official of original jurisdiction to the next highest authority within forty-eight hours, although all judgments of the Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei were, indeed, final. 1/ Kreiskommandanten had the additional power of pronouncing sentences of confiscation provided that existing laws permitted such actions. 2/

German military tribunals were also given competence in cases involving minor crimes (délits) committed by German and Italian nationals even if the acts took place prior to the occupation. 3/ French prosecuting authorities were compelled to turn over to the German military tribunals all data concerning punishable acts of which German or Italian nationals were accused. 4/

In addition to maintaining indigenous law, French officials in occupied areas were compelled to enforce German decrees and regulations as the law of the land. According to an ordinance of 5 August 1941, Kreis- and Feldkommandanten could require the proper French officials to collect fines imposed by German officials as disciplinary measures. 5/ Moreover, French authorities charged with criminal prosecutions had to submit to German military officials all data in the following matters: crimes and misdemeanors against the German Army or personnel attached to it; offenses committed in buildings occupied by the German Army; and violations of regulations for the security of German troops or for the accomplishment of the purposes of occupation. If disinterested, the Germans returned the cases to the French for disposition, but, if the military authorities decided to conduct the trials, the French authorities

1/ Vbl. Fr., 10 August 1942, p. 430.
2/ Vbl. Fr., 10 February 1941, p. 183.
3/ Ibid., p. 182.
4/ Vbl. Fr., 24 November 1940, p. 144.
5/ Vbl. Fr., 2 September 1941, p. 281.

were compelled to execute the sentences on the demand of the occupation authorities.1/

Following the total occupation of France, the direct exercise of judicial powers by German military authorities was extended to some parts of the South Zone. In an ordinance of 15 February 1944, applicable to the Mediterranean coastal departments, the Kommandant des Heeresgebiet Südfrankreich (see C 3, a) invoked most of the German penal legislation already operative in the North Zone.2/ All acts of sabotage, the carrying of arms, assistance to enemy troops, pillage, and the lighting of fires were declared crimes punishable by German military courts according to German law.3/ With the increasing activities of the Resistance, the German military authorities also invoked regulations making it mandatory for any lawyer defending those accused of sabotage to reveal any knowledge he might have of arms or materials of war concealed by his client, even though such revelation might infringe the rules of professional secrecy. Both in the North and South Zones, however, the Germans showed an increasing tendency to work through the French judicial machinery.

2. Vichy Judicial Machinery

a. The Reconstruction of Judicial Processes

The Vichy judicial machinery through which the Germans preferred to execute their desires in disciplinary matters represented few structural changes in the legal machinery inherited from the Third Republic. The government of Marshal Pétain endeavored to secure judicial support for the regime and its policy of collaboration by purging the bench and legal profession of dissident elements, by removing former safeguards for the assurance of fair trials, and by superimposing on the existing framework a number of special courts designed to

1/ Vbl. Fr., 23 September 1940, p. 86.
2/ These departments included Pyrénées-Orientales, Aude, Hérault, Gard, Bouches-du-Rhône, Var, and Alpes-Maritimes.
3/ Verordnungsblatt des Kommandanten des Heeresgebietes Südfrankreich für den Küstenbereich Mittelmeer, 15 February 1944, pp. 2-3.

implement the dictatorship. Shortly after Pétain received the grant of full powers on 10 July 1940, large numbers of judges were dismissed and many were arrested. Included in this group were Jews, Freemasons, and those suspected of Communistic, pro-British, or De Gaullist sympathies. Similarly, all Jews, Freemasons, and foreign-born practitioners were excluded from the legal profession.

Judges were constantly informed that the meting out of justice was not simply a matter of the evidence and a just decision. The security of the state was emphasized as a prime consideration and judges were constrained to follow directives issued by the various Cabinet members. These laid down the minimum scale of penalties for special classes of offenders and provided for particularly harsh treatment for De Gaullists, those found guilty of criticizing the government, and all Jewish defendants. In some cases, no judgment could be reached without submitting the trial records to Vichy and receiving instruction as to the punishment to be accorded. Other directives of the government stipulated that offenses involving Germans (in the South Zone) were to be judged "for policy reasons, with due regard for the nationality of the parties," and laid down rules for the procedures to be observed in transferring cases to German military courts.

In further attacks on the guarantee of fair trial, the Vichy government deprived defendants accused of communistic or anarchistic acts of their right to choose their own counsel. The secrecy of jury decision was ended by the requirement that magistrates take an active part in jury deliberations. Magistrates and jury together constituted a committee which decided points of law as well as points of fact and the sentence which the accused was to receive if found guilty. Likewise, changes in the criminal code were decreed to provide the death penalty for a number of crimes which formerly were not considered as capital. Finally, regional and departmental prefects were endowed with special judicial powers in cases involving

individuals deemed "harmful to the security of the state." On the order of the prefect such persons could be (1) expelled from the department or region, (2) compelled to reside in a specified locality, (3) placed under enforced residence, or (4) sent to a concentration camp as an administrative internee.

b. Special Courts

Vichy's judicial collaboration with the German authorities was especially emphasized in the system of special courts designed to try political as well as criminal offenders.

(1) The Supreme Court of Justice (Cour Suprême de la Justice)

Established shortly after Marshal Pétain assumed full power, the Supreme Court of Justice, which sat at Riom, had the specific task of trying ministers and military leaders charged with having led France into war against Germany. As the trial of such leaders as Blum, Daladier, Mandel, and General Gamelin reacted against the Pétainist regime rather than the former Republican leaders, the proceedings were discontinued on the agreement of the German and Vichy governments. In June 1943, an official decree dissolved the Supreme Court of Justice.

(2) The Council of Political Justice (Counseil de la Justice Politique)

The Council of Political Justice, which did not actually constitute a court or exercise independent judicial functions, was created in August 1941 to give Pétain legal sanction for proceeding against the more important political enemies of the Vichy regime and the policy of collaboration. Entrusted with the records of the Supreme Court of Justice, this body consulted with the Marshal on sentences to be passed against the high officials who held office in the ten years prior to August 1941. Under its auspices several life sentences were pronounced against political leaders of the Third Republic.

(3) The State Tribunal (Tribunal d'Etat)

Created by the decree of September 1941, the State Tribunal was given

jurisdiction in "all those actions likely to cause disorder, to bring about breaches of the peace, to disturb international relations, or in any way be harmful to the French people." There were two divisions of the Tribunal, one for the North Zone situated at Paris, and the other for the South Zone located at Lyon. In November 1941, the Cour Martiale de Gannat and the Cour Criminelle Spéciale, originally created by the Vichy government for the trial of all attempts against the security of the nation and of black-market cases, were suppressed and their jurisdiction transferred to the Tribunal d'Etat.

(4) Special Sections within the Courts of Appeal (Cours d'Appel)

In May 1941, a Court for Night Offenses (Tribunal des Infractions Nocturnes) was created to try all offenses committed during blackouts. Judicial procedure in this court was very swift; offenders had to be brought to trial within eight days following apprehension and decisions had to be rendered within ten days of the inauguration of proceedings. There was no appeal from its decisions.

Prior to November 1942, each court of appeals in the North Zone had a special section for the trial of cases involving "Communists" and anarchists, especially those accused of assaults on German soldiers. In the South Zone, military tribunals were empowered to transform themselves into courts martial to hear similar cases. With the total occupation, the use of special sections of the courts of appeal was adopted for the entire country.

(5) Special Courts Martial (Cours Martiales Speciales)

With the increasing activity of the Resistance groups, the Vichy government issued a decree in January 1944 endowing Joseph Darnand, the Secretary General for the Maintenance of Order, with the authority to create special courts martial for the trial of cases of terrorism. Composed of three judges, these

courts were not bound by existing law as regards their deliberations and their sentences were not subject to appeal.

Throughout the Vichy period, considerable confusion existed as to the clear line of jurisdiction among these various courts. Apparently, the government itself decided the particular court to be entrusted with cases of opposition to the Germans or to the Pétainist regime. The State Tribunal, the special sections of the courts of appeal, and Darnand's special courts martial all had as their announced purposes the suppression of acts of hostility against the Germans and against the Vichy government. Even the Courts for Nocturnal Offenses had instructions to take into consideration the "race and personal opinions" of the offender in handing down its judgments. Nevertheless, Vichy's repressive judicial system operated only imperfectly. In the period following the total occupation, Gestapo agents frequently arrested judges sitting in the various courts. These arrests were never made public and it appears that the Vichy authorities themselves were not informed of the reasons which compelled German action.

F. CENSORSHIP, PROPAGANDA, AND CULTURAL CONTROLS

1. Censorship and Propaganda

a. The German Propaganda Staff (Propagandastaffel)

The organization and direction of German censorship and propaganda in France were the responsibility of the Propaganda Staff (Propagandastaffel), headed by Major Schmidtke. The Propaganda Staff was organized under the Administrative Section of the Military Government (See C 1, b (2)) but received its principal directives from Goebbel's Reich Ministry of Propaganda. Its Paris headquarters were divided into three sections to supervise the operations of censorship, propaganda, and cultural activities. This central organization was extended through regional and local levels where the various sections functioned in conjunction with the Kommandanturen. Both propaganda and censorship units were established on the departmental level. In some areas, however, where no propaganda staff was established, these functions were conducted by the censorship staff (Zensurstaffel).

At first confined to the North Zone, the German propaganda and censorship services were extended to the South Zone following the total occupation. In this area, however, the Germans relied considerably on the corresponding services of the Vichy government for the actual exercise of censorship functions. To a much more limited extent, this was also true of the North Zone where the German authorities were increasingly disposed to relinquish these functions to the French authorities and to confine themselves to a purely supervisory role.

b. The Vichy Secretariat of Information (Secrétariat d'Information)

With the exception of postal, telegraph, and telephone service, Vichy censorship and propaganda controls were

exercised through the Secretariat of Information, which was organized in 1941 as a part of the Ministry of Information and directed successively by Paul Marion and Phillippe Henriot.

The services of the Secretariat of Information were organized on a regional basis with regional delegates, departmental delegates, and honorary delegates for the arrondissements. The delegates of the government on the departmental and local levels were assisted, in matters of propaganda, by Comités de Patronage and Comités d'Action. The former were composed principally of departmental officials, but the latter comprised citizens designated on the basis of their loyalty to the aims of the Vichy government and its policy of collaboration. This regional organization complemented the central services in the task of controlling censorship and the propaganda activities of radio, cinema, and the press.

2. Postal, Telephone, and Telegraph Services

In the early period of German occupation, rigid controls were exercised over postal, telephone, and telegraphic communications in the North Zone. Postal service was limited to the North Zone, the use of telegraph and teletype was forbidden, and telephone service was restricted to local networks with the exception of a few inter-zonal lines assigned for the use of Vichy government officials. 1/ These regulations were later relaxed; postal service with foreign countries under German domination was permitted and, finally, postal communications with the South Zone were resumed. Letters from the North to the South Zone were routed through the German censorship office to a German military field post office (Deutsche Feldpost) which delivered them to French exchange post offices on the demarcation line. Long-distance calls and the sending of telegrams were also permitted subject to the authorization of the German Feldkommandantur. 2/

With the resumption of these services, German controls

1/ Vbl. Fr., 29 July 1940, p. 58.
2/ Vbl. Fr., 10 February 1941, p. 178.

were increasingly exercised through the personnel of the French services of the Ministère de Postes, Telephones et Telegraphes (PTT). The PTT staff functioned in the censorship of mail, although to what extent is not known. Likewise, a special French agency, the Contrôles Techniques, operated in censorship activities. Except in the reserved and forbidden zones, German interest in censorship waned considerably, especially after the total occupation, and only the communications of suspected individuals were supervised with any regularity.

3. The Radio

German control of the French radio systems was established on the basis of Article 14 of the Armistice Convention which provided that all transmissions on French soil were to stop immediately. After a few days, however, the German Armistice Commission agreed to the resumption of French broadcasting under a system of rigid controls. Until the total occupation of France, French broadcasting was divided into two units: the German-controlled network which operated through the Radio-Paris group and affiliated stations, and the Vichy-controlled group based on the French National Network, (Radiodiffusion Nationale Française -- RDN) and the French Federation of Independent Stations, (Fédération Française des Postes Privés). Following the occupation of the South Zone, German control over the Vichy system, which previously had been exercised indirectly, was superimposed directly upon all French radio activity. The Paris and Vichy networks were supervised by Dr. Bofinger, who was attached to the German Propaganda Staff and who received his directives from Berlin.

a. Radio-Paris

In the North Zone, German controls over the Radio-Paris group were operated through Dr. Bofinger's staff, which was composed of both German and collaborationist Frenchmen. The propaganda of the Radio-Paris network was far more violent in

its anti-Allied tone than that of the South Zone system, and the news services were supplied largely by German agencies.

b. The French National Network (Radiodiffusion Nationale Française--RDN) and the French Federation of Independent Stations (Fédération Française des Postes Prives

In the South Zone, even after the total occupation, the Germans endeavored to conceal their control behind nominal Vichy authority. The organization of The French National Network was regulated by the Vichy ordinance of 7 November 1942. A Superior Council (Conseil Supérieur) of four members, in addition to a president and an administrator general, supervised the operations of the system. German controls were exercised through a liaison service (Direction Générale de la RDN) which received Nazi directives from its Paris offices. The many private stations of the South Zone, organized into the French Federation of Independent Stations, were brought under the administrative, financial, and program control of the RDN, through which it received the orders of the German propaganda authorities.

4. The Cinema

a. German Legislation

German controls of film production and the cinema industry were operated largely through the French authorities. This was true even in the North Zone, where the German military authorities were particularly active in ensuring their control over this vehicle of propaganda. A decree of the Military Administration issued on 9 September 1940 stipulated that only those films approved by the Military Commander through his appointed experts could be shown. A second decree issued on the same date required special authorization to operate a motion picture theater. Such authorization had to be sought through the North Zone organization of French theater

operators (Groupement des Directeurs de Théâtres Cinématographiques). 1/ Because of the popularity of American films, however, the German authorities, even before November 1941, took steps to establish a more effective control over their showing. A decree of the Military Commander of 21 May 1941, provided that all films shown before 1937 together with their publicity, should be turned over to the Film Censorship Section of the German Propaganda Staff (see F 1, a), and required that all motion picture houses receive the authorization of the same office to operate. 2/ Following the total occupation this regulation was extended to the South Zone, where the Vichy government took steps to ban all American films, as had previously been done by the German military administration in the North Zone. By this time, however, the German propaganda authorities had already begun to exercise their jurisdiction through the mechanisms established by the French Government.

b. The Committee for the Organization of the Film Industry (Comité d'Organisation de l'Industrie Cinématographique-COIC)

In December 1940, the Vichy government established the Committee for The Organization of the Film Industry for the purpose of controlling the film industry. With its headquarters at Paris, the COIC was founded with German approval and was designed to facilitate Nazi domination. It was composed of five sections: (1) technical, including raw film manufacture, studios, and laboratories; (2) film production; (3) collaboration among scenario workers, artists, and technicians in the creation of films; (4) film distribution; and (5) theater management.

Under the auspices of the Comité all "undesirable" elements, particularly Jews, were purged from the profession.

1/ Vbl. Fr., 16 September 1940, p. 80.
2/ Vbl. Fr., 21 May 1941, p. 264.

In May 1942, all producing companies were compelled by law to maintain headquarters in Paris, and, finally, every member of the profession was required to have a working card approved by the German authorities. In matters of censorship, film producers had to receive permission from the COIC for the production of films; those actually produced had to receive the approval of the French censors and of the German occupation authorities (prior to the total occupation the latter provision applied only to those pictures shown in the North Zone). The COIC operated at first under the Jurisdiction of the Secretariat of State for Information (see F 1, b) but in May 1942 it was brought directly under the supervision of the Chief of the Government. Liaison between the government and the industry was maintained by a Director Générale d'Etat du Cinéma.

c. Continentalfilm

While censorship played a great part, in the last analysis German control over the French film industry was due to German ownership. Not only did the Germans purchase a considerable number of theaters in both zones but they also established a film company, Continentalfilm, which, by virtue of German control over the allocation of raw materials, enjoyed an almost complete monopoly of film production. Organized with a capital of twenty-five million marks, Continentalfilm was owned and directed by Germans but utilized French actors and actresses. Films produced by the company circulated in both North and South Zones through the Alliance Cinématographique Européene, which maintained branches throughout France.

5. The Press

a. The North Zone

With the establishment of German military administration

in the North Zone, the daily and weekly press was brought under strict censorship. The press section of the central Propaganda Staff (see F 1, a) established at Paris was in charge of Captain von Grothe, former chief Paris correspondent of the DNB. Regulations issued by the German military authorities forbade any criticism of the German authorities or of the government of Marshal Pétain, restricted press commentaries on foreign policy to DNB communiqués and news broadcasts over the German-controlled Paris network, and required all editions to be submitted to the German censorship authorities before release to the public.

German control over the North Zone press was facilitated by the establishment of corporative bodies of journalists. That in the North Zone was known as the Corporation Nationale de la Presse Française and was headed by Jean Luchaire of the Matin and director of the Nouveaux Temps. In addition to subsidies granted to individual collaborationist papers, German influence was also exerted through Nazi-controlled press agencies which operated in the North Zone. The most important of these were the Agence Française Information de Presse (AFIP) and Inter-France which was connected with Transocean.

b. The South Zone

It was only gradually that the South Zone press was brought completely under German control. Until February 1941, the various South Zone journals were able to give guarded expression to anti-German sentiments. However, in that month, the entire system of newspaper censorship was revised by Vichy and placed under the newly formed Secretariat General for Propaganda and Information, which was under Paul Marion (see F 1, b). German controls over the South Zone papers were exercised through the medium of this office even after the total occupation. Vichy relations with

the press were conducted largely through the South Zone corporation of newspapers (Fédération Nationale des Journaux Français).

6. Cultural Controls

a. Book Publication and Circulation

The German military authorities made every effort to ensure a cultural attitude in France favorable to the Reich. An early ordinance of the Military Government barred from the French schools certain history text books that presented what was considered an anti-German bias.1/ With the help of the Vichy government and through their control of paper allocations, the German authorities were able to achieve effective control over literary publications in both the North and South Zones. Paper allocations were made under the joint auspices of a Vichy commission of control which was responsible to the Ministry of Production and the German Paper Commissioner (Papierbeauftragten), organized under the economic section of the Military Administration at Paris. Only books written on the subject of the war or politics had to be submitted to the German censorship, however; for books of a purely literary character, the publisher bore the responsibility.

b. Miscellaneous Controls.

The Germans made numerous attempts to purge French sources of anti-German documents and to improve cultural relationships between the two people. According to newspaper reports, the Military Commander of Paris established a commission of German historians to study French archive material on Franco-German relations. In January 1944, a German Institute (Deutsches Institut) was established at Marseilles under the patronage of the German Consul General to provide the French and German people with an opportunity to get together and to emphasize their racial kinship as a means of eradicating the old antagonisms which had separated them.2/

1/ Vbl. Fr., 19 September 1940, p. 79.
2/ Pariser Zeitung, 22, 24 January 1944.

c. The "Protection" of Art

Shortly after the Armistice, the Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces, under the guise of "protecting art objects and not allowing them to be damaged or stolen," decreed that objects of art should not be moved from their places or modified in any way except with the consent of the military authorities. Likewise, no transfer of ownership of works of art could take place without similar consent.1/ According to German-inspired sources, these masterpieces were placed under the tutelage of the Art Division of the Military Administration, which was responsible for their preservation.

In reality, however, the German solicitude for the safety of works of art was for the purpose of removal to Germany. German agents were dispatched to Paris to acquire masterpieces and they were assisted by an art counsellor at the Paris legation. Works of art belonging to French Aryans were secured through purchase while those held by Jews were usually sequestered. Acquisitions were made from museums as well as from private individuals.

1/ Vbl. Fr., 15 July 1940, p. 49.

G. THE GENERAL PATTERN OF GERMAN ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION

1. Economic Provisions of the Armistice Convention

There were no explicit provisions in the Armistice Convention which sanctioned German control of French economic life. Nevertheless, Articles 13 and 17 were pointed in that direction. These clauses stipulated that the French Government should take the necessary guarantees to prevent the transfer of economic valuables or stocks from the territory to be occupied by the Germans either to the unoccupied area or abroad. Such valuables and stocks could be disposed of only with the consent of the German Government. Moreover, the French Government bound itself to see that ports, industrial establishments, and shipyards were not damaged or destroyed and pledged itself to carry out any repairs that were ordered by the German authorities.

In the last analysis, however, the basis for the economic exploitation of France, which was organized in accordance with the Göring decree of August 1940, lay not so much in these specific clauses as in the general tone of the Armistice, which gave the Germans actual military control of the richest sections of France and supplied them with occupation payments sufficient to allow almost complete domination. As was true in the area of political control, however, German success in the economic sphere was due in large part to the collaboration of those elements in the French population which had long desired a rapprochement with the Nazis. Nevertheless, there were some cases in which the disposition of French industrialists to work for the Germans were predicated solely upon (a) the lack of raw materials for for the production of domestic goods, (b) the fear of losing machines and other equipment liable to confiscation if not put to use, and (c) the desire to protect labor from deportation to Germany.

2. Stages in German Economic Exploitation

German economic policies applied in France passed through three distinct stages. In the period immediately following the fall of France, the Germans drained France of all equipment, raw materials, and stocks which were of use to the German war machine. The objective of this general requisitioning was not only the bolstering of German war economy but the achievement of a situation in which French industry, deprived of all the raw materials necessary for operation, would be more amenable to German domination.

Following the initial looting of stocks of finished products and raw materials, there ensued a period in which the Germans attempted to restore French industrial capacity in order to obtain a maximum production in France for German usage. Orders were not confined to the industries of the North Zone but were extended to South Zone plants as well. In addition to the willingness of collaborationist industrialists to work for the Germans, the incentive for placing French plants at Nazi disposal was supplied by the necessity of keeping industrial establishments going for reasons of internal economy. Because the Germans had secured complete control of materials of industrial production, French manufactures were easily directed towards Nazi ends.

From the middle of 1943, French production of finished products for the German war machine ceased, and French industrial capacity was directed to the repair and maintenance of German machines and general war equipment. This third period in the German economic exploitation of France was induced by the German conviction that it was more economical to concentrate new industrial production within the Reich, to which the necessary foreign labor could be sent. It was in this period that German demands on France emphasized more strongly the recruitment of labor

rather than indigenous industrial production.

The general pattern of the German economic exploitation of France was best illustrated in the Kehl Plan drawn up in the early days of occupation by German textile experts in conjunction with French industrialists and the Ministry of Production. The main features of this plan were as follows:

a. All stocks of wool, jute, and cotton which had been purchased by the French Quartermasters and piled up in French ports and in the occupied part of France were to be delivered to Germany.

b. An important quantity of wool, of different kinds, accumulated in manufacture in Northern and Western France, was also to be delivered to German industrial concerns and to the German Army for the needs of the occupation corps.

c. France was also required to deliver a large percentage of collection of its rags and wastes, as well as of its current wool and flax crops, to Germany.

d. As a counterpart to these deliveries, Germany would supply France with raw materials for the manufacture of artificial fibers; these would consist chiefly of wood pulp and of some paper twine to replace jute. It was also agreed that the Germans would supply France with German equipment and machinery, as well as German methods and patents. The Kehl Plan, therefore, aimed not merely at the exhaustion of French resources but also at the bringing of the French textile industry within the German orbit.

3. The Agencies of German Economic Exploitation

a. The War Economy and Armament Board (Wehrwirtschafts-und Rüstungsstab -- Wi-Ru)

The most important of the German agencies for the economic exploitation of France was the War Economy and Armament Board, originally an agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces,

War Economy Staff (OKW W-Stab) but subordinated in 1942 to the Speer Ministry, the Reich Ministry of Armament and War Production. Wi-Ru played a major role in the initial looting of France and the same agency, the name of which was changed, probably in 1943, to the Armament and Procurement Staff, France (Rüstungs-und Beschaffungsstab Frankreich), was responsible for selecting the factories which were to be entrusted with production for German use and for making the necessary arrangements for the allocation of raw materials.

b. The Central Contracts Office (Zentralauftragsstelle -- ZAST)

In coordinating French industrial production with German needs, Wi-Ru operated in conjunction with the Central Contracts Office. ZAST was established in the autumn of 1940 for the purpose of co-ordinating the sub-contracts allocated to French industry by German agencies and manufacturers. Its staff, composed largely of civilians and technicians, operated throughout France. A special price-fixing organization established prices for French industrial deliveries according to the same methods applied by the corresponding agencies in Germany, and on the basis of experience gained there.

c. The Economic Section of the German Military Administration

Both Wi-Ru and ZAST operated in the North Zone under the auspices of the Economic Section of the German Military Administration headed by Dr. Michel (see C 1, b, (2)). Exercising the economic authority of the Military Administration in the North Zone, this agency was primarily interested in the distribution of raw materials. However, it also conveyed the instructions of Wi-Ru and ZAST to the French authorities.

d. The Economic Section of the German Armistice Commission

The functions performed by the Economic Section of the

German Military Administration in the North Zone were duplicated in the South Zone by the corresponding division of the German Armistice Commission. (See C 2, a (1), (b).) This division, in fact, was composed largely of Wi-Ru officials and members of the ZAST. Orders to the French authorities in the South Zone were given through the medium of the Armistice Commission, which maintained local offices throughout the Zone for the planning and implementation of requisition orders and the inspection of war plants.

e. The Reichskreditkasse

Although primarily concerned with the financing of local expenditure of the German armies and the purely financial arrangements for the payment of the occupation costs, the Reichskreditkasse was also an important instrument for the economic exploitation of France. (See H 1, c (1) and H 3.) It functioned as a bank of issue and supplied the invading forces with a special currency (Reichskredit-kassenscheine) which was used in the earlier period of occupation to pay the German troops in France. French banks were compelled to exchange this currency for francs at the rate of twenty francs to the mark. 1/ With this ready-made currency, the drain of French goods and raw materials to Germany was facilitated.

f. The German Chamber of Commerce in France (Verbindungs-stelle Frankreich)

To create an atmosphere favorable to Franco-German collaboration an expanded version of the former German Chamber of Commerce was established in Paris in 1940. The purpose of this organization was to serve as a center for the exchange of Franco-German business information. The Lyons Fair, held in the summer of 1941, was taken as an opportunity to

1. Vbl. Fr., 21 June 1940, p.31.

demonstrate the solidity of Franco-German economic collaboration and its extension to the South Zone. A branch of the Chamber of Commerce was established at Lyon as a means of bringing the industrial areas of South France into closer relations with Germany.

g. The Central French Agency for German Collaboration (Délegation Générale aux Relations Economiques Franco-Allemandes)

At the request of the Germans, a French agency was established to deal with the broader problems of Franco-German collaboration under the leadership of Jacques Barmaud. Organized within the Paris branch of the French Treasury, it centralized and co-ordinated all negotiations of an economic character. It kept in close touch with Michel's economic section of the North Zone Military Administration (see G 3, c) and with the French economic experts attached to the Armistice Commission. (See G 3, d.)

4. The Exploitation of Existing Stocks

a. The Requisitioning of Stockpiles

Under the direction of Wi-Ru inspection corps, France was drained of whatever stocks of finished products, food, and raw materials were of immediate use to the Germans. To facilitate these operations, the Military Administration, even before the fall of France, had issued an ordinance which was applicable to the Netherlands and Belgium as well as to France and which ruled that all merchandise listed in the annex to the order was considered requisitioned. Ownership of such materials could not be transferred without the permission of the German authorities and every possessor of such goods was required to furnish a monthly inventory to the occupational officials.1/

1/ Vbl. Fr., 21 June 1944, p. 17.

Much later, when the stocks of prime materials had been brought under control, the Germans turned their attention to scrap of various sorts. The Service for the Salvage and Utilization of Scrap and Old Materials (Service de la Recuperation et de l'Utilisation des Déchêts et des Vielles Matières) was set up under the supervision of the Economic Section of the German Administrative Staff, and French prefects in each department were placed in charge of the collections.

Control of incoming ships through the Military Administration in the North Zone and the Armistice Commission in the South Zone also facilitated the requisitioning of materials destined for France. Ships coming into port were restrained from landing their cargoes until they were inspected by the German authorities. According to reports, usually from 60 to 80 percent and sometimes the whole cargo was seized for shipment to Germany. This procedure was followed quite frequently in the case of foodstuffs shipped from North Africa to Marseilles.

b. Jewish and Enemy Property

Another source of German loot in France was Jewish property. In addition to the liquidation of Jewish holdings in the various French financial and industrial firms, the German military authorities in the North Zone levied a huge fine on the General Union of Jews in France (Union Générale des Israélites de France), a compulsory association established by the French law of 29 November 1941 (see M 2, b (3)). French authorities were made responsible for the assessment and collection of the fine, the proceeds from which were deposited at the Reichskreditkasse. 1/

The extent to which the Germans seized enemy property in France has not as yet been determined. As in the case of

1/ Vbl. Fr., 20 December 1941, p. 325.

goods liable to requisition, however, such property had to be declared at the offices of the German Military Administration in Paris. After the original order of 22 November 1940, extensions were made to include Russian and American property when those countries became involved in the war. American property had to be declared before a Special Office for the Declaration of American Property. All American interests were taken under German trusteeship and American factories were operated to produce for the German war machine.

From the Bank of France the Germans seized gold deposits belonging to Belgium and Poland. Belgium thus lost $228,000,000, and Poland $62,000,000, worth of gold. This gold had been received by the Bank of France with the understanding that it would be kept from falling into German hands. The Belgium gold was returned to the North Zone, however, after it had been sent to Dakar.

H. BANKING AND FINANCE

1. The Banking System

a. The Committee for the Organization of Banks (Comité Professionel d'Organisation des Banques)

In line with its general scheme of establishing the cooperative state, the Vichy government, by a decree of 5 May 1941, established a Committee for the Organization of Banks with almost complete power to reorganize and control the banking business of France. The authority of the Committee included the right to close financial institutions, compel mergers, and to lay down regulations for operation and competition. The Committee consisted of six banking experts nominated by the Minister of Finance and supervised by a government commissioner. Its executive organ (Commission de Contrôle des Banques) consisted of the Governor of the Bank of France as chairman, the Director of the Treasury, and the president of the Committee.

b. German Controls over French Banks

From July 1940 to July 1941, the German occupation authorities exercised direct supervision over French banks through a German official who was at the same time commissioner to the Bank of France and head of the German-created Office for the Supervision of French Banks. Since all French banks had their headquarters or important branches at Paris the entire banking system of France was thus supervised by the German military authorities in the occupied territory. Under the penalty of being declared null and void, certain categories of banking acts had to be submitted for the approval of the Office for Supervision.1/ In the latter part of June, however, this form of surveillance was terminated because the German authorities found it more advantageous

1/ Vbl. Fr., 26 July 1940, p. 53.

to work through the Vichy Comité Professionel, to which they attached a commissioner.1/ The occupation officials, however, continued to maintain a separate commissioner at the Bank of France.

c. German Banking Establishments in France

(1) The Reichskreditkasse

The Reichskreditkasse was almost the sole German financial institution operating in France. Although it was permitted to engage in ordinary banking activities such as the buying and selling of commercial paper and the making of short-term loans, the Reichskreditkasse was an organ of German military government in France and was primarily concerned with the issue of occupational currency and the regulation of German accounts arising out of expenditures of the Military Government and the receipt of the occupational costs. (See G 3, e, and H 3.) As was true in other occupied countries, the Reichskreditkasse in France was responsible to a Council of Administration in Berlin.

(2) The German Labor Bank (Bank der Deutschen Arbeit)

The German Labor Bank was the financial institution of the German Labor Front, and the only function of importance performed by the branch which was established at Paris seems to have been in connection with the activities of the various sections of the Nazi Party.

(3) The Aero-Bank

The Aero-Bank was the Paris branch of the German Aviation Bank (Bank der Deutschen Luftfahrt). The purpose of the Paris branch is not quite clear, although it was ostensibly established to finance aircraft production and heavy industry in France. Because there was little need for its service, in view of the Reichskreditkasse and collaborationis

1/ Vbl. Fr., 17 July 1941, p. 54.

French banks such as the Banque Worms and the Banque de Paris et de Pays-Bas it has been assumed that it was engaged in the acquisition of holdings in French industry.

2. Investment Activities

a. The German Acquisition of French Foreign Securities

Although there is little or no evidence to support statements that German financiers utilized their domination over French economic activities to secure holdings of French bank shares, pressure was exerted to secure possession of certain categories of French foreign securities. This was particularly true of French investments in Balkan titles which Germany desired for political reasons. According to reports, German interests purchased French holdings in the Yugoslav Charbonnages de Trifail, the Roumanian Petrol Companies of Columbia and Concordia, and the Banque Commerciale Roumaine. Payment for these shares was made by the transfer of French securities formerly held in Holland and obtained by the Germans. Payment, however, for the Mines de Bor, French-owned copper mine in Yugoslavia, which was purchased by the Germans through Laval, was said to have been made from funds received as occupation costs.

The Germans secured additional French-held Danubian securities. Hungarian titles purchased included those of the Hungarian General Credit Bank, secured from the Union Européene, and Schneider participation in the Czech Mining and Foundary Company was purchased by the German-controlled Bohemian Union Bank and the Société des Usines de Fabrication des Tubes et des Forges de Somourie in Poland. Other securities acquired by the Germans from French investors included Swiss Nestlé, Swedish SKF, Royal Dutch Shell stocks, and shares of South African mining companies. French capitalists possessing various German investment securities

were obliged to sell to the Germans at the normal Berlin stock exchange rate, the sums being transferred in French francs at the official rate of twenty francs to one RM. In the greater number of cases, negotiations for the purchase of these securities took place through the Foreign Exchange Control Staff (Devisenschutz Kommando) of the German Military Government.

b. Franco-German Investment Collaboration

German success in securing ownership of desirable French foreign shares may be attributed, for the most part, to the collaboration of powerful French banks such as the Banque de l'Indo-Chine, the Banque Worms, and the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas. These powerful French institutions were allowed to profit from anti-Jewish legislation in France, Holland, and Belgium by securing control of French and foreign securities which the Germans did not desire. Moreover, the Germans probably used these institutions to conceal their purchases of stocks and bonds in various foreign countries. Thus, while they may have lost certain Balkan and Polish titles, the pro-German financiers were amply recompensed by the occupation authorities in the form of opportunities for new investments and of profits from the handling of the German business.

3. The Occupation Costs

By the terms of Article XVIII of the Franco-German Armistice, the French Government was made responsible for the maintenance costs of the German occupation troops. According to Colonel Böhme, formerly chief of staff of the German Armistice Commission, the amount to be paid was fixed every three months by negotiations between the Armistice Commission and the French Delegation. According to available information, the original figure was set at 400 million

francs a day or 146 billion francs a year. The amount of this indemnity remained unchanged until 10 May 1941 when, as a result of a meeting between Hitler and Darlan at Berchtesgaden, the daily indemnity was reduced from 400 to 300 million francs. From 10 November, the date of the total occupation of France by both German and Italian armies, until the Italian collapse, the daily costs were placed at 500 million francs for Germany and 30 millions for Italy. If these figures for the daily indemnity paid to Germany over four years are reliable, the total amount paid to the Germans during the entire period of occupation should be about 600 billion francs. According to a recent statement of the French Finance Minister, however, the total cost of the occupation was 860 billion francs.1/

At first, the cost of occupation was paid from the French Treasury, but, beginning on 25 August 1940, the Treasury was compelled to make special arrangements with the Bank of France for advances to cover the indemnity demands. At the end of 1942 more than two-thirds of the total indemnity paid had been advanced by the Bank of France.

The payments due the German Government for these occupation expenses were deposited periodically at the Bank of France and credited to the account of the Reichskreditkasse. With a yearly income which varied from 120 to 180 billion francs, the German occupation authorities drew on these accounts to pay the direct costs of occupation including the maintenance of the soldiers, requisition purchases, and the execution of public works for the German Army. Following the total occupation of 1942, the French agreed to pay the increased sum of 500 million francs daily in cash. By means of these payments, the German authorities were able to pay their troops in francs and, as a result, the

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1/ France (London), 10 November 1944.

Reichskreditkassenscheine (see G 3, e), with which the soldiers were formerly paid, were retired. By the time that the German armies withdrew from France, the occupation currency was no longer in circulation.

4. Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade

In the field of foreign exchange, controls were exercised primarily through French agencies. In the earlier period of occupation, however, the German authorities were empowered to request whatever information they desired as to foreign exchange held by, or foreign claims due to, Frenchmen. German controls were far more direct as they applied to the line of demarcation between the North and South Zones. In currency matters the military authorities treated the South Zone as a foreign country prior to the total occupation. By an ordinance of the Military Commander, no means of payment larger than ten marks in French or foreign currency could be taken from the North to the South Zone.1/ Vichy regulations in both zones prevailed only insofar as they were acceptable to the military authorities of the occupied territory.

Vichy control of foreign exchange revolved largely around foreign trade regulations. The French franc was used exclusively for internal payments and was kept out of the field of foreign payments. For this purpose, the Office of Exchange was set up to operate in both zones and in North Africa under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of State for National Economy and Finance. This office received payments from French importers and paid French exporters in domestic francs. By means of export and import licenses, however, the foreign trade agency was able to regulate commerce in such a manner that an approximate balance was

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1/ Vbl. Fr., 21 June 1940, p. 45.

struck between purchases and sales abroad, thus protecting the gold resources of the country from depletion.

The bulk of French exports -- over 70 percent -- went to Germany. Payments arising out of Franco-German trade were made according to a clearing agreement of 14 October 1940, which covered payments between France, on the one hand, and Germany, Norway, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg, on the other. The French Exchange Office, which acted as clearing agent, participated in the organization of international payments, centered in the German Clearing Office in Berlin. Claims against the Berlin Clearing Office were used for payment of French imports from Germany and from several German-controlled countries. Only small quantities of goods were made available by German authorities for export to France, however. As a result, French claims against the Berlin Clearing Office increased continuously to the point where they exceeded one hundred billion francs at the time of German withdrawal. The French Government, therefore, had to advance to French exporters the larger part of their claims.

I. GERMAN CONTROLS OVER FRENCH INDUSTRY

1. The Vichy Reorganization of French Industry

a. The Dissolution of the Pre-war Industrial Structure

The reorganization of French economic life which followed the establishment of the Vichy regime undoubtedly was carried out with a view to accomplishing the so-called "National Revolution" and to setting up a corporative state on the Fascist model. It was because this reorganization facilitated collaboration and the establishment of German domination, however, that it received the approval and the encouragement of the German military authorities.

The reorganization of French industry was based on the decrees of 16 August 1940, 10 September 1940, and 12 November 1940. By the decrees of 16 August and 12 November, the pre-war associations of French industrialists, including the Confédération Générale du Patronat, the Comité des Forges, and the coal and electrical power trusts, were dissolved and replaced by Committees of Organization (Comités d'Organisation).

b. The Committees of Organization (Comités d'Organisation)

Composed of industrialists chosen by the government and covering every branch of commercial and industrial activity, the Committees of Organization were established on local, regional, and national levels. Their principal functions were to facilitate government control over individual industrial and commercial concerns and to secure maximum efficiency in the utilization of plants, material, and labor in order to meet German as well as domestic demands. The Committees had the authority to investigate the facilities, stocks, and labor supply of the enterprises under their jurisdiction, to establish production programs, and to supervise the distribution of raw materials and equipment among their members. They also had the right to recommend selling prices for their goods and services.

Each Committee was headed by an Executive Director who often exercised almost complete control over the group and functioned under the direction of the Ministry of Production. The latter was represented on each Committee by a Commissioner whose approval was necessary for all decisions. The new organizations, which tied in admirably with the German machinery of control, were also utilized by the domestic corporate interests to further the concentration of industrial power in France.

c. The Central Office for the Distribution of Industrial Products (Office Centrale de Répartition des Produits Industriels)

The distribution of raw materials to French industry operated through the Central Office for the Distribution of Industrial Products, established by the law of 10 September 1940. This central allocation board functioned under the Ministry of Production and was divided into the following sections, each dealing with a specific commodity: Pig Iron and Steel; Non-ferrous Metals; Coal; Petroleum, Gasoline and Liquid Fuels; Chemicals; Textiles; Paper and Paper Containers; Leather and Hides; Rubber and Carbon Black; Lumber; Industrial Fats and Soaps; Building Materials; and Miscellaneous Commodities.

Directed by an Allocator (Répartiteur), assisted by an advisory committee, and supervised by a governmental commissioner, each section was in charge of the allocations of raw materials to the industrial users in its particular sphere. These allocations were made through the Committees of Organization, to whom the individual industrialists had to submit their requests for transmission to the Central Office.

In addition to allocating raw materials to the various industries, the Central Office also had the authority (1) to

compel producers to sell to specified consumers, and consumers to buy from specified producers; (2) to prohibit or restrict the use of raw materials for certain purposes; and (3) to enforce and supervise the sale of existing raw materials and commodities.

2. The Mechanism of German Controls

German control over French industry was exercised through the Committees of Organization and the Central Office for the Distribution of Industrial Products which were supervised by the Central Contracts Office, the Economic Section of the German Military Administration at Paris, and the corresponding division of the German Armistice Commission which operated from the same center. (See G 3, b,c,d.) Officials of the War Economy and Armament Board (Wi-Ru) who were attached to the economic sections of the Military Administration in the North Zone and of the Armistice Commission in the South Zone were represented in the various sections of the Central Office for the Distribution of Industrial Products and in the central Committees of Organization.

The Central Contracts Office co-ordinated the German orders placed in France, to which orders received from Germany for production in France were forwarded. After receiving the necessary approval of the economic section of the Military Administration or the Armistice Commission, the order was passed on to the individual manufacturer through his Committee of Organization. With the allocation of raw materials and industrial output closely supervised by the Wi-Ru officials in the Central Distribution Office and the Committees of Organization, German authorities were able to maintain close control over the French industrial system and to exploit French industrial capacity with maximum efficiency.

On the factory level, German control in the North Zone

was enhanced by definite regulations issued by the Military Commander. From the earliest days of the occupation, the Military Commander assumed the power to appoint temporary administrators for businesses whose proprietors were absent, for enterprises which by virtue of ownership or management were under enemy influence, and for Jewish-controlled plants.1/ A more far-reaching ordinance of November 1940 authorized the appointment of special delegates of the German administration to factories. These delegates were entitled to receive full information about the installations and operations of the factory, had access to the books, and took part in all managerial conferences. Their remuneration was fixed by the occupation authorities and was payable by the factory.2/ An additional decree assured control over individual corporations by providing that resolutions of shareholders' meetings were valid only when approved by the Military Commander.3/

3. German Infiltration into French Industry

It is impossible to judge the extent to which the Germans acquired actual financial interests in French industry. According to the positive evidence available, the Germans as a rule contented themselves with virtually complete exploitation of productive capacity without attempting to acquire any important acquisition of corporate stock. In the following instances, however, it is reasonable to believe that the German industrialists and financiers acquired ownership interests:

a. The important Kuhlmann dyestuff interests were taken over by the specially created Francolor, a Franco-German concern in which the German participation amounted to 51 percent

1/ Vbl. Fr., 21 June 1941, p. 31.
2/ Vbl. Fr., 6 October 1940, p. 296.
3/ Vbl. Fr., 30 October 1940, p. 300.

of the share capital.

b. The French artificial textile industry was unified under a new France-Rayonne Company, in which the German Zellwolle Ring took a 33 percent participation. The France-Rayonne Company was formed at the beginning of 1941 by the amalgamation, reportedly under German pressure, of nineteen French corporations engaged in cellulose and cassein artificial textile manufacture and had a working capital of two hundred million francs. All these corporations retained their financial individuality but were linked to France-Rayonne by a holding company in which participation was proportional to productive capacity. France-Rayonne, in turn, was tied to the German artificial textile cartel under a ten-year agreement, according to the terms of which the German Ring held a one-third participation. A new factory, built according to German specifications and equipped with German machinery, was constructed at Roanne, near Lyon. Raw materials and wood pulp were supplied from Germany as were the plants' technical advisers.1/

c. The Germans also acquired an interest in the publicity side of the Havas News Agency.

According to unverified information, the German Foreign Exchange Control Staff, attached to the office of the Military Commander, facilitated the acquisition of shares in many of the leading industries of France. It was reported that, through the good offices of this organization, the Germans had acquired a large section of shares in the Compagnie Internationale des Wagons-Lits, as well as in the S.A. Automobiles Peugeot, the Compagnie de Five-Lilles, the Forges et Aciéries de la Marine et d'Homécourt, and the Galéries Lafayette. The same source reports that, as the result of negotiations with Vichy, the Germans also acquired control of the Produits Chimiques, an important French chemical company.

1/ Agence Economique et Financière, 10 June 1942.

J. GERMAN INFLUENCE ON FRENCH AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

1. Vichy Agricultural Organization

Vichy agricultural policy was influenced by German purposes in that it was compelled to produce sufficient foodstuffs to meet the demands of German requisition as well as to supply a minimum subsistence to the French population. It was in keeping with collaborationism, as also with the concept of the National Revolution, that Vichy sought to reconstitute a strong peasantry "conscious of its mission and proud of its task." Therefore the government attempted, though with but little success, to improve the rural standard of living, strengthen the family as the unit of rural life, and to incorporate the peasant class into the framework of a corporative economy.

a. State Regulation of Agriculture

Under Vichy, the Secretariat of State for Agriculture and Food Supply, together with appointive officials of the government, exercised rigid controls over the production, distribution, and consumption of foodstuffs on departmental, regional, and national levels. On the regional level, prefects were responsible for the allocation and distribution of agricultural produce in their individual areas. Assisted by a Director for Economic Affairs, a Director of Agriculture, and a Director of Supply, the regional prefect had the authority to set up stockpiles of food and to prevent the sale or removal of agricultural supplies in accordance with plans laid down on the national level. On the departmental level, similar functions were performed by the departmental prefects, while on the local level the mayors were entrusted with the execution of orders received from higher authorities.

On the national level, the Secretariat for Agriculture exercised control through Central Supply Committees which in 1941 replaced the National Allocation Boards set up originally in 1940. Chosen by the Ministry of Agriculture and assisted by representatives chosen from the semi-governmental Association of Families and from the municipal councils, these Central Supply Committees were responsible for the collection and mobilization of available agricultural resources. Private commercial companies, organized under the strict supervision of the government, executed orders for the purchase of commodities which were issued by the Ministry of Agriculture on the advice of the Supply Committees. The operations of these private companies were restricted to purchases designed to balance supply and demand between surplus and deficit areas, while cantonal Purchasing Commissions, appointed by the government, allocated the quotas to be delivered to the government by local producers. Deliveries to the government were usually made to meet German requisition demands.

b. The Agricultural Corporation (Corporation Paysanne)

In pursuit of its aim to reconstitute a strong and "proud" peasantry, the Vichy government created the Agricultural Corporation patterned after the Italian Fascist corporation. The Agricultural Corporation included all those engaged in agricultural production, whether proprietors, laborers, or rural artisans. While membership was not compulsory, the decisions of the various unions were binding on all agriculturalists.

The Corporation Paysanne comprised an organizational hierarchy which extended from the local to the national level. The local union was headed by a syndic, chosen by the membership of the Union. As an encouragement for

large famalies, each member had as many votes as he had children or other members of his family living with him. The syndic was the official representative of the agriculturists; he assisted the mayor in the execution of the government's policy and represented the union in the higher echelons of the Corporation.

Above the local unions were the regional unions which corresponded in area to the departments. The regional unions consisted of twelve members nominated by the Minister of Agriculture on the recommendation of the local syndics. One step above the regional unions was the National Syndical Chamber (Chambre Syndicale Nationale), appointed from among the members of the regional unions by a syndic national, who, in turn, was appointed by the Minister of Agriculture. The National Syndical Chamber had advisory functions over all proposed agricultural legislation. At the top of the entire organization of the Corporation Paysanne was the National Co-operative Council of Agriculture, composed of representatives of the National Syndical Chamber and members of associated agricultural organizations.

2. German Controls over French Agriculture

a. Production Controls

German agricultural leaders (Landesführer) were detailed to keep accounts of the production of individuals in each arrondissement. German requisition demands were conveyed through the Feldkommandanturen to the proper French authorities. As a rule, the collections for these requisitions were operated through the cantonal Purchasing Commissions under the supervision of the departmental prefecture. If collection was difficult, however, requisitions were ordered through the mayors of the communes, who could utilize the gendarmerie for the seizure of the goods if necessary. Within the Ministry

K. GERMAN EXPLOITATION OF FRENCH LABOR

1. Labor Organization under Vichy

a. Pre-war Labor Movement

When the Vichy government assumed control in France, one of its first important measures was the reorganization of the trade unions. The interest which it focused on the trade unions arose from anxiety to control the most dangerous source of opposition to the government and to the policy of German collaboration. The measures taken by the Vichy government did not meet a vigorous opposition largely because of the fact that even before 1940 the French labor movement was in a state of decline induced by factional strife following the abortive strike of 1938 and by pacifist and Communist disaffection at the outbreak of the war.

The principal French labor organization, then as now, was the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT). The CGT was composed of various units organized on local and regional bases. Starting from the smallest, which organized the workers of a particular industry in each locality, these units were combined into horizontal associations (unions) which included all the units of the locality or department. Vertical associations were similarly organized to include all units of a particular industry in one fédération. The various unions and federations were gathered together at the top in the national CGT. Because of the difficulties already mentioned, the CGT had declined from a membership of nearly 5 millions in 1937 to only 3.5 millions in 1939. At the time of the collapse of France, it is estimated that its membership strength had fallen to a mere 800,000. Nevertheless it was the strongest of the French labor confederations, surpassing the Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens, the Union Fédérale des Employés de France, and the Fascist-inclined Confédération des Syndicats Professionels Français.

of Agriculture and Food Supply a special section was maintained, responsible for negotiation with the occupying forces.

b. The German Exploitation of Abandoned Lands

By a decree of 30 December 1940, the Military Commander authorized the Feldkommandanturen to name a provisional administrator for agricultural exploitation on the proper demand of the chief of the East German Land Exploitation Company (Ostdeutsche Landbewirtschaftungsgesellschaft).1/ This company, which originally operated in Poland, was brought into France for the purpose of placing under cultivation abandoned lands in the Forbidden Zone. Later known as the Reichslandgesellschaft, this exploitation company was attached to the Economic Section of the Military Government in France. By 1942, the organization had five economic directorates, two at Laon and one each at Charleville, Nancy, and Dijon. According to reports made in December 1940, the Reichslandgesellschaft was exploiting 170,000 hectares of land between Lake Geneva and Flanders, of which 109,000 were said to be in the department of Ardennes alone.2/

The direction of farming activities was in the hands of German peasants while the actual labor was performed by French prisoners of war, North Africans, and some Poles. The purpose of the German authorities was undoubtedly to increase agricultural production in this area for the use of the German Army. The benefits were expected to flow not so much from the land actually cultivated under German direction as from propagandizing the use of more modern techniques among the surrounding French peasants. According to German propaganda accounts, the cereal harvests in the arrondissement of Rethel were increased from ten quintaux per hectare to eighteen in the period from 1941 to 1942.3/

1/ Vbl. Fr., 24 November 1940, p. 304.
2/ News Digest, 20 December 1943.
3/ Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 30 November 1942.

b. The Vichy Reorganization of the Trade Unions

(1) The Decree of 16 August 1940

The Vichy decree of 16 August 1940 which had dissolved the organizations of employers, such as the Comité des Forges, likewise suppressed the national trade confederations, including the Confédération des Syndicats Professionels Français, as well as the CGT and the Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens. This Vichy decree did not involve the suppression of unions within single trades or professions. While the dissolved employer organizations were almost immediately replaced by various Comités d'Organisation (see I 1, b), it was until 1941 that steps were taken to reorganize labor associations.

(2) The Labor Charter (Charte du Travail)

On 4 October 1941 the Vichy government published a new Labor Charter which was designed to form the basis of future labor organization and of worker-employer relations. Drawn up by the Comité d'Organisation Professionelle, composed of renegade trade unionists as well as business men and state officials, the Charter was a composite of traditional social Catholic doctrines and corporative authoritarianism borrowed from Fascist Italy. Although the syndicates of workers within the trades and professions were preserved, the former voluntary associations were replaced by syndicats uniques in which membership was compulsory. Separate syndicates were to be organized for employers, laborers, and salaried employees in each industrial district. These syndicates were prohibited from engaging in religious or political activity and almost their sole function was to elect representatives to the Comités Sociaux.

The Comités Sociaux (Social Committees) consisted of representatives of the employers, laborers, and salaried personnel and were designed to function as a deliberative body in all matters concerning their professional activities.

As with the syndicates, all politics were forbidden. Each factory having more than one hundred employees had a Comité Social Mixte with members chosen from the various categories of workers. The functions of this committee were purely advisory, all real power being left in the hands of management. This form of mixed committee selected by the various syndicates ultimately was to be extended to departmental, regional, and national levels.

While various measures of corporative organization were included in the charter, they were never implemented. However, clauses which forbade collective bargaining and strikes were rigidly imposed. The Charter guaranteed a minimum wage for all workers on a regional basis and provided for family allowances and extra pay for skilled work.

For the most part, the Labor Charter never became operative. Although some six thousand Social Committees and mixed committees in industry were eventually formed, they never functioned as elective units. Only a few syndicats uniques were ever established, the various local unions and regional federations being continued under strict surveillance. The principal result of Vichy attempts at trade union reorganization was to disrupt the labor movement to the point where little organized opposition could be offered to recruitment for labor in Germany.

2. German Recruitment of French Labor

a. Labor Service within France

(1) The French Manpower Problem

Until the program for sending laborers to Germany had removed a substantial number of workers from France, the hiring of labor for work in French factories was no problem. On the contrary, Vichy was forced to take drastic measures to combat unemployment produced by the lack of raw materials and power and the consequent closing of factories. Little or no

difficulty was experienced in hiring laborers for work in the factories still functioning. But by April 1942, due to German labor recruitment, the need for manpower was felt throughout French industry. To free workers, hours of work were lengthened. A decree of the German Military Administrator for France provided that German authorities could regulate hours of work. The Military Governor himself determined hours when a whole region or whole branch of industry was to be affected, while the Feldkommandant could determine hours for an individual enterprise. Employers were required to submit to the Feldkommandantur statement of the number and types of workers released through the lengthening of hours of work. This measure was designed to facilitate recruitment of French labor for German production within France and in the Reich.

(2) Organisation Todt (OT)

Besides working on German orders in French factories, a number of French workers were engaged directly in German projects in France. The greater number of those workers were employed by the Organisation Todt for work on fortifications, especially along the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts. When intensive construction of fortifications was begun in 1941, there were from fifty to sixty OT camps; by 1943 the number increased to over 450. Comprehensive figures on the number of workers involved are lacking. The number demanded for work on Mediterranean fortifications was said to be one hundred thousand. Soon after German occupation of the Vichy Zone, four thousand workers were recruited to work in Toulon alone. The total requests for new recruits for the Organisation Todt in April 1943 was estimated to be about two hundred thousand. It is probable that not all of this number were recruited for service in France; indeed, many Frenchmen served the OT in Germany, on the Eastern Front,

and wherever labor in connection with military installations was needed. On the other hand, many Dutch, Belgian, and other workers were brought into OT camps in France.

The ranks of the OT were filled by various means. In some cases men serving their term of compulsory service in labor camps were set to work under its direction. Internees were often taken from their camps and set to work. In the summer of 1942 over twenty-five German employment offices (Werbestellen) were operating in the Vichy Zone to recruit labor for Germany. In each of these there was a representative of the OT, who could presumably pull out any recruit he fancied or draw his quota from the rolls. Under the Vichy compulsory labor laws, French authorities provided such personnel as the German authorities demanded. According to a Vichy law, prefects or mayors who had been appointed by them could call up any French national from eighteen to sixty-five years of age for labor service with occupation troops in the Vichy Zone.

Like the factories working for Germany, however, the OT suffered from the demand for more and more workers to go to Germany. Many young men assigned to the OT were taken directly from the OT camps and sent to Germany. As many had no chance to visit their homes before leaving, this may have been a device to facilitate the sending of full contingents to Germany by not allowing any opportunity for going into hiding to escape deportation.

The OT in France was directed by a Frontführer from a central office in Paris. A delegate of the French Government was attached to the office to convey German decisions to the French authorities. The OT also had a number of French guards who were given supervisory authority over their French compatriots. These guards were recruited principally from French LVF volunteers. (See D.1, d (1), (d).)

Once a worker had been enrolled into the OT, there was no possibility of his leaving. An ordinance issued by the Militärbefehlshaber on 18 December 1942 rendered OT employees guilty of attempted escape liable to the death penalty. The Germans allowed no official French intervention between the OT and the conscript workers. Even Vichy officials admitted that absence of any French influence in OT labor camps left the workers without even the nominal protection of a French organization to safeguard them against the arbitrary will of their employers.

b. French Labor Service in the Reich

(1) Initial Stages

The export of labor from France to Germany commenced in 1941 and at first affected only foreign workers, particularly Jews and refugees. In this period the recruitment of French labor was voluntary and was conducted in the North Zone through German labor-recruiting officers. Because of the declining standard of living in France, and the refusal of unemployment compensation to workers in the North Zone, German propaganda efforts to secure labor met with some success. According to Vichy sources, more than 170,000 voluntary workers were in Germany at the end of June 1942.

(2) The Concentration of Industry and Commerce

With the greatly increasing German demand for labor, volunteers began to fall below German needs in 1942. Moreover, French workers began to exhibit strong aversion to labor service in the Reich. In order to economize on skilled labor employed in France, the Vichy government inaugurated a program for the concentration of industry and commerce in such a way as to eliminate smaller concerns and to render remaining businesses more efficient. By the end of 1942, more than ten thousand factories had been closed or merged with other enterprises.

A similar policy was effected in commerce. As a result, several thousand skilled workers were made available for German service. Although this program was inaugurated and carried out by Vichy, its inspiration was undoubtedly German.

(3) The Relève

Although the concentration of industry and commerce freed a large number of workers, it did not result in any appreciable increase in the volunteers for Reich service. As the German authorities began to exert greater pressure on Vichy, Laval, who had returned to power as Chief of the Government, found himself forced to satisfy these demands at the expense of an increasingly unwilling population. To attract laborers to the new program, he launched the Relève, a scheme involving the return of prisoners of war in exchange for labor volunteers. The Relève resulted in four successive agreements between Laval and Sauckel, the Reich Commissioner for Labor:

(a) By the agreement of June 1942, Germany was pledged to return 50,000 prisoners of war for 150,000 skilled workers.

(b) In December of the same year, Germany agreed to exchange an additional 50,000 for 250,000 workers.

(c) In April 1943, the German authorities demanded 220,000 conscripted laborers for service in Germany and an additional 190,000 for work in France. Although further releases of prisoners of war were to occur, the number was not specified. In fact, Germany had not redeemed its promise to repatriate the 100,000 prisoners of war stipulated in the first two agreements.

(d) In the period between October and December 1943, a fourth Laval-Sauckel agreement called for 238,000 volunteers to be secured by 1 March 1944. It is believed that in this

agreement Germany pledged the repatriation of a prisoner of war for each laborer who "volunteered."

(4) Labor Deportation

Although the first Laval-Sauckel agreement spoke of "volunteers," in the North Zone compulsion was actually the rule. The Germans demanded fixed quotas of men according to locality, and joint Franco-German commissions decided the levies which were to be made on individual factories. As a result, until the total occupation the great majority of French labor deportees came from the North Zone. After November 1942, however, the principle of conscription was followed throughout France.

French labor conscription in 1942 and after was carried out by Vichy decrees which fixed the age limits of the draftees, arranged the categories from which they were to be solicited, and applied the principle of military conscription to labor by making two years of labor service compulsory for the classes of 1940-43. In addition, the Vichy government facilitated German demands for specialized professional and labor personnel such as doctors, railway men, postal and telegraph workers, and miners.

Because labor draftees were constantly escaping from Germany and because the figures of the actual number of recruits were never fully revealed, it is difficult to estimate the number of French laborers sent to Germany. An approximate estimate is rendered more difficult by virtue of the fact that many prisoners of war were converted to "free workers." According to figures released by the Provisional Government after the liberation, more than 2,450,000 French subjects were held in Germany at that time. Of these, 750,000 were placed in the category of labor deportees, 600,000 were described as political deportees, and 225,000 were former prisoners of war converted to "free laborers."

3. The Machinery of Controls

a. The General Commission for Compulsory Labor Service (Commissariat Général pour le Service du Travail Obligatoire -- STO)

The responsibility for co-ordinating German labor demands with available manpower was at first divided between the departmental prefects and the Secretary of State for Labor. As the labor problem assumed increasing importance, however, new agencies were established. The Direction de la Main-d'Oeuvre was created in January 1943 as a branch of the Ministry of Labor to assist in conscription, but it was replaced in the following month by the Commissariat Général pour le Service du Travail Obligatoire (STO), under Laval's direct control. The STO operated in conjunction with regional and departmental delegates covering the whole of France as well as through the departmental prefects.

b. German Controls

For the most part the Germans preferred to secure their labor demands through the agency of the Vichy government. However, there are many indications that the Germans often secured their desires by direct orders. In some cases, German demands for local labor in the construction of fortifications, for armament works, and for temporary services with the occupation troops were communicated directly to prefects and mayors. In the North Zone especially, when urgency required, the Germans requisitioned the necessary men in the easiest way possible, which often was by seizure on the streets, in tramways, and railway stations.

In some cases, German military authorities took over the administrative functions usually confided to the Vichy government. In some localities of the North Zone they demanded that employers submit lists of their personnel directly to the Kreiskommandantur. In like manner, infractions of

labor regulations laid down by Vichy were dealt with by German military tribunals in cases involving unauthorized employment of French labor (See E 1.) These were exceptions, however, and throughout the period of occupation the Germans were content to allow the Vichy government to assume the full responsibility for meeting German demands for labor to serve in France and in the Reich.

L. TRANSPORTATION

The Armistice gave Germany direct control over railways, roads, inland waterways, maritime shipping, and air transport. In the case of railroads, the French Government was to turn over without further damage railway lines and equipment, to make all repairs necessary for their restoration upon demand of the German authorities, and to supply personnel and equipment to maintain normal peacetime service. A subcommission of the Armistice Commission was charged with supervision of the application of provisions concerning transport.

1. Railway Transport

While the railways were left under the direction and control of the Vichy government, those of the occupied zone were operated by the French authorities, subject, however, to German supervision. Some coastal lines in the Forbidden Zones were operated by German military personnel. Local branch railroads were, in practice, controlled by the local French official, usually the prefect. Necessary modifications in service were decided by the Secretary of State for Commerce and by departmental committees of three members each, set up to eliminate duplication in road and rail services. German controls were exercised by the Wehrmachtsverkehrsdirektion and the Eisenbahnbetriebsdirektion, which included a special railroad security unit. The Germans exercised their authority through the French officials, however, and did not administer the railroads directly. All French traffic managers were duplicated by German administrators, who had extensive power in the allocation of transport facilities.

2. Motor Transport

a. Control of Motor Vehicle and Road Transport

The use of the roads and of motor vehicles by

Frenchmen was controlled by the French Secretary of State for Transport, who was the licensing authority for motor vehicles. Control over the number and type of vehicles was made possible through the licensing procedure; restrictions in both categories were rigidly applied. Road traffic was regulated by the law of 1 April 1943, which was almost the exact counterpart of the German law for road traffic in the Reich and consequently obviated all necessity for direct German intervention in French controls over motor traffic.

b. German Requisitions

The requisition of public and private transport facilities for German use was operated through the local Chief Engineer for Roads and Bridges, an official responsible to the Secretary of State for Communications, to whom the request was submitted. The Chief Engineer then passed the request on to enterprises registered with the Roads and Bridges Service or with the Road Transport Group (a professional association). German authorization was necessary for motor transport crossing the frontiers of occupied France. A Fahrbereitschaftsleiter attached to the office of the Feldkommandantur (exceptionally, to the office of a nearby Kreiskommandantur) issued the necessary permits. This official was responsible to the Bevollmächtigte für den Nahverkehr in the office of the chief of the military district.

3. Inland Waterways

The French authorities emphasized the exploitation of rivers and canal networks in order to relieve the pressure on the railways. The waterways were under the French Secretary of State for Communications and were controlled by the National Office of Navigation. Delegates of the Organizing Committee for Inland Water Transport co-operated with the office in the control of operations.

A German commissioner was attached to the Organizing Committee as in every major French economic enterprise. No contract for inland water transport was valid unless countersigned by the regional director responsible to the Office of Navigation. German controls were operated for security rather than economic reasons. This explains directives such as those of the Feldkommandant of Besançon which forbade traffic on towpaths during certain hours.

4. Maritime Shipping

Stringent measures were also taken by the Germans with regard to ocean navigation. The Armistice required that all commercial and harbor vessels in French ports remain there until authorized by German and Italian authorities to sail. All French vessels outside French ports were to be directed to return and place themselves under similar surveillance. Representatives of the Armistice Commission controlled the cargoes of all incoming ships. At the time of the occupation of the South Zone, German and Italian authorities are said to have seized all except eighteen French commercial vessels. Those left to the French were of small tonnage and were operated by French companies under the nominal control of the French Government, but actually were supervised by German authorities.

5. Commercial Aviation

French commercial aviation was most drastically affected by German orders. By the terms of the Armistice, all flights over French territory were absolutely forbidden. Even in the Vichy Zone, representatives of the Armistice Commission were given absolute control over all airfields. These terms were relaxed gradually until in the spring of 1942 a number of airmail services operated in France and from France to Tunis and Wiesbaden. Passenger service of a plane a day in each direction over the circuit Vichy-Toulouse-

Marseille-Lyon-Vichy was maintained, as well as a service between Paris and Vichy. The German Armistice Commission gave permission for such operations which were carried on by the Reseau Aerien Français, a company under the control of the French Government through a Department of Airports.

M. ANTI-SEMITIC LEGISLATION

1. German Legislation and Controls

a. The Restriction of Personal Liberties

As the Germans advanced through Northern France a general exodus of the Jewish population to the South took place. This movement halted with the Armistice, however, and, in the period immediately following, a large number of Jewish refugees returned to their homes in the occupied area. This tendency was halted by the Military Commander in a decree of 27 September 1940 which prohibited all refugees professing the Jewish religion or having more than two Jewish grandparents from returning to the North Zone.

This initial German decree provided the pattern of anti-Semitic controls in France, which were rapidly extended through the North Zone. Subsequent ordinances affecting the personal liberties of the Jewish population provided that Jews had to register with the authorities before 20 October 1940 and would receive identity cards stamped with the word "Jew." On 26 April 1941 an ordinance defined a Jew as anyone having at least three Jewish grandparents, or anyone having but two if he or she were currently married to a Jew.1/ A year later, Jews over six years of age were forbidden to circulate in the streets without wearing the yellow Star of David under the threat of harsh penalties. They were also prohibited from frequenting certain entertainment establishments and generally all public places. The designation of such places was made the responsibility of the Höherer SS-und Polizei Führer. Moreover, Jews were forbidden to enter stores except in designated hours.

b. Economic Regulations

Economic regulations against the Jews in the North Zone

1/ Vbl. Fr., 30 September 1940, p. 92.

were even more drastic than the measures restricting their personal liberties. A series of decrees made it mandatory for every Jewish-owned business to be marked distinctly as a "Jewish Enterprise;" compelled the registration of all Jewish industrial firms and partnerships and the control of such forms by appointed Aryan commissioners, and prohibited Jews from engaging in wholesale and retail commerce, restaurants, the hotel business, insurance, tourist agencies, banking, and advertising.1/

To weaken further the economic status of Jews, the Military Commander in December 1941 levied a fine of one billion francs on the Jews of the zone. This fine was divided among the Jewish population according to the instructions laid down by the Military Commander and was collected through the Union des Israélites (see M 2, b (3). In fact, the Germans came to rely more and more on French legislation and French organizations for the exercise of Jewish controls. The Aryan commissioners appointed to conduct former Jewish businesses were designated by the Vichy government, and in 1942 the German authorities recognized the Provisional Administrators' Control Services organized under the Commissariat for Jewish Affairs as the competent authority in economic affairs relating to the Jews. (See M 2, b (1) and (2).)

2. Vichy Anti-Semitic Legislation

a. The Nature of Vichy Anti-Semitic Legislation

It was not until October 1940 that the Vichy government, under German pressure, inaugurated its own system of Jewish controls. The decree of 3 October 1940 defined the Jew against whom discriminatory legislation was enacted in much the same manner as the corresponding German decree in the North Zone. Those Jews who fell within the defined categories

1/ Vbl. Fr., 20 October 1940, p. 112.

were debarred from all governmental and elected positions, including civil services posts. They could not serve as judges, teachers, officers, soldiers, or sailors, nor could they occupy any important position in an institution subsidized or controlled by the state. According to the Vichy law, however, exemptions could be granted to those persons who had rendered special services to the state or whose families had been resident in France for at least five generations and who had earned special distinctions for benefit conferred on the country. Likewise those Jews who were combat veterans of World War I or who had served with distinction in World War II were exempted from the operations of the law.

As the Vichy government tended to become increasingly fascist and pro-German, legislation against the Jews was made more drastic. A law of June 1943 deprived all Jews naturalized since 1927 of their citizenship rights. Other measures provided that Frenchmen considered as Jews under the law should not change their residence without previous authorization. Such authorization had to be secured from the departmental prefects and travel permits had to be issued by police commissioners. In 1943, a course in Jewish history was instituted at the Sorbonne for the purpose of informing every student on the nature of the Jewish question and the necessity for separating the Jew from the main currents of French economic, political, and social life.

b. The Organization of Anti-Semitic Controls

(1) The Commissariat for Jewish Affairs (Commissariat aux Questions Juifs)

To co-ordinate anti-Jewish legislation, a Commissariat for Jewish Affairs was set up on 29 March 1941 under Xavier Vallat, a former Rightist deputy and lawyer, who was succeeded in 1942 by Darguier de Pellepoix. The function of the new Commissariat, which was organized under the Ministry of Interior, was to

suggest to the Government, all laws and decrees necessary for regulating the Jewish problem, to implement the Jewish Statute of 3 October 1940, to co-ordinate the anti-Jewish activities of the various ministries, to supervise the liquidation of Jewish properties, to appoint commissioners, and to control police regulations concerning the Jews.

(2) The Provisional Administrators' Control Services (Service du Contrôle des Administrateurs Provisoires)

The most important section of the Commissariat for Jewish Affairs was the Provisional Administrators' Control Services, which controlled confiscated Jewish properties in the unoccupied area. In the North Zone, these administrators were appointed at first by the German authorities, but, after May 1941, the Military Administration likewise exercised its controls over Jewish properties through the Vichy agency. This action was facilitated by the anti-Jewish financial legislation of Vichy, which in 1941 was brought into harmony with German measures in the North Zone. The decree of 26 August, patterned after similiar German legislation in the North Zone, ordered the sale of Jewish businesses, together with their merchandise and other properties. The decree covered all industrial, commercial, and artisan undertakings and all leased premises, exempting only state bonds and residential properties. The proceeds of the sale were to be deposited in the owner's name in a central government fund, after a 10 percent reduction to cover expenses and to provide relief for destitute Jews. In the disposal of property owned in common by Jews and non-Jews, the latter were granted a four-month postponement in liquidating their share.

(3) The General Union of Jews in France (Union Générale des Israélites de France)

On the advice of the Commissariat for Jewish Questions the Vichy government in December 1941 created the General Union of Jews in France. This Union was endowed with the

authority to represent the rights and interests of the Jewish people in relations with the French authorities. All Jews domiciled in Paris were compulsory members. Fees to cover its expenses were fixed by the Commissariat for Jewish Questions according to the means of the members. By the decree of 28 August 1942 the aggregate of these fees was fixed at six million francs monthly levied on Jewish families in both occupied and unoccupied zones.

With the establishment of the Union, all other Jewish societies in France were dissolved and their assets transferred to the Union. The only exceptions were religious institutions concerned solely with the practice of the Jewish faith. The Union was authorized to raise loans not exceeding two hundred million francs. The principal function of the Union, however, was to facilitate the Vichy-German domination and exploitation.

Appendix I. THE PRINCIPAL GERMAN OFFICIALS IN FRANCE

Field Command

Commander in Chief, Army Group D:
Field Marshall Karl von Runstedt
Commander, Military District, Southwest France:
Colonel General Haase
Commander, Military District Northwest France:
Colonel General Dolmann
Commander, Army District, South France:
Lieutenant General Niehoff
Military Commander of Paris:
Lieutenant General von Bemberg-Langfield (replaced
Lieutenant General Schaumberg in 1943)

German Diplomatic Representation

German Ambassador at Paris: Otto Abetz
German Consul General, Vichy: Krug von Nidda
German Chargé d'Affaires, Vichy: Renthe-Fink

German Military Administration North Zone

Military Commander of France: General Otto von Stulpnagel
Chief of the Military Staff: Colonel Speidel
Chief of the Administrative Staff: Dr. Schmid
Chief of the Economic Section: Dr. Michel
Director, Special War Economy and Armament Board:
Lieutenant General Barckhausen
Chief of the Propaganda Staff: Major Schmidtke
Chief of Radio Censorship: Dr. Bofinger
Chief of the Press Censorship: Captain von Grothe
Chief of the Kulturdirektion: Dr. Kruess

German Armistice Commission

President: General Vogel
Chief of Staff: Colonel Böhme
Inspector of the French Army: General Neubronn von Eisenberg
Chief of the Economic Delegation: Hemmen
Chief of the Division of Ground Forces: Lieutenant
Colonel Burcklin
Chief of the Naval Division: Admiral Waffer (succeeded by
Captain Petzold)
Chief of the Division of Air Forces: Colonel Knoblauch
(replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Sorge)
Chief of the Division of War Industry: Colonel Steffer
(succeeded by Lieutenant Colonel Queiss)
Chief of the Administrative Division: Colonel Müller
Chief of the Division of External Relations: Colonel Henke
(replaced in 1943 by Legionsrat Taffel)

German Police Officials in France

Höherer SS-und Polizeiführer: Major General Karl Albert Oberg
Commander of the Security Police and the Security Service:
Dr. Helmut Knochen
Commander of the Order Police: Von Schweinichen
Director of the Criminal Police: Dr. Halswick

Appendix I. (continued)

German Police Officials in France (continued)

Commander of the Security Police and the Security Service, Paris: Dr. Lischka
Commander of the Security Police and the Security Service, Bordeaux: Dr. Luther
Commander of the Security Police and the Security Service, Lyon: Dr. Werner
Commander of the Security Police and the Security Service, Marseilles: Dr. Reczeck
Commander of the Security Police and the Security Service, Montpelier: Dr. Tanzmann
Commander of the Security Police and the Security Service, Toulouse: Dr. Bilfinger

Appendix II. THE LOCATION OF THE FELDKOMMANDANTUREN:

NORTH ZONE

Department	Town	Number
Aisne	Laon	602
Alpes Maritimes	Nice	994
Ardennes	Mézières-Charleville	684
Aube	Troyes	533
Aude	Carcassonne	734
Bouches du Rhone	Marseilles	497
Calvados	Caen	723
Charente	Angoulême	887
Charente Inférieure	La Rochelle	540
Cher	Bourges	776
Côte d'Or	Dijon	669
Côtes du Nord	St. Brieuc	665
Doubs	Besançon	560
Eure	Evreux	801
Eure et Loir	Chartres	897
Finistére	Quimper	752
Gard	Nimes	747
Gironde	Bordeaux	529 (?729)
Hérault	Montpellier	563
Ille et Vilaine	Rennes	549
Indre et Loire	Tours	788
Landes	Mont de Marsan	541
Loir et Cher	Blois	641
Loire Inferieure	Nantes	518
Loiret	Orléans	589
Maine et Loire	Angers	595
Manche	St. Lo	722
Marne	Chalons-sur-Marne	306
Marne, Haute	Chaumont	563

Appendix II. (continued)

Department	Town	Number
Mayenne	Laval	582
Meurthe et Moselle	Nancy	591
Meuse	Bar-le-Duc	627
Morbihan	Vannes	750
Nievre	Nevers	568
Oise	Beauvais	638
Orne	Alencon	545
Pyrénées Orientales	Perpigan	997
Saone, Haute	Veseul	661
Sarthe	Le Mans	755
Seine Inférieure	Rouen	517
Seine et Marne	Melun	680
Seine et Oise	St. Cloud	758
Sevres, Deux	Niert	651
Somme	Amiens	580
Var	Draguignan	800
Vendée	La Roche sur Yon	505
Vienne	Poitiers	677
Vosges	Epinal	622
Yonne	Auxerre	745

Appendix III. THE LOCATION OF LIAISON HEADQUARTERS (VERBINDUNGSSTÄBE): SOUTH ZONE

Department	Town	Number
Ain	Bourg	433
Allier	Montluçon	786
Alpes, Basses	Digne	792
Alpes, Hautes	Gap	555
Ardeche	Privaz	577
Ariège	Foix	?
Aveyron	Rodez	802
Cental	Aurillac	494
Correze	Brive	739
Creuse	Guéret	896
Dorogne	Périgueux	730
Drome	Valence	998
Garonne, Haute	Toulouse ?	?
Gers	Auch	993
Indre	Chateauroux	990
Isère	Grenoble	735
Jura	Lens-le-Saunier	711
Loire	St. Etienne	992
Loire, Haute	Le Puy	995
Lot	Cahors	792
Lot-et-Garonne	Agen	798
Lozère	Mende	989
Puy-de-Dome	Clermont-Ferrand	889
Pyrénées, Basses	Pau	732
Pyrénées, Hautes	Tarbes	659
Rhone	Lyon	590
Saone et Loire	Macon	893
Savoie	Chambery	502

Appendix III. (continued)

Department	Town	Number
Savoie, Haute	Annécy	988
Tarn	Albi	?
Tarn et Garonne	Montauban	996
Vaucluse	Avignon	761
Vienne, Haute	Limoges	?